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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G) (2003). 
THE PARTIES 
The parties that are germane to this appeal include Plaintiffs Jack G. Charlesworth, 
Rennly J. Charlesworth, Jace Martinson, Gaylee C. McEwan, and Mirid Weidner 
(collectively "Charlesworths"), and Defendants Ruth C. Reyns, individually ("Defendant 
Reyns"), and Ruth C. Reyns, Arie William Reyns, and Alan W. Reyns, as joint trustees 
under the Reyns Family Trust Agreement dated August 27, 1985 ("Reyns Family Trust") 
(collectively "Reynses"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court was correct in ruling as a matter of law that, in 
light of the material undisputed facts in this case, an accounting was not a prerequisite to 
the Charles worths' action. (R. at 526.) 
2. Whether the district court was correct in ruling as a matter of law that, in 
light of the material undisputed facts in this case, the Charles worths' claims for breach of 
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion were not barred by the applicable 
statutes of limitation. (R. at 527-32.) 
Both of these issues were determined by the district court on summary judgment. 
Accordingly, the district court's rulings are reviewed for correctness. Prince, Yeates & 
Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, H 10, 94 P.3d 179. In reviewing the grant or denial of 
a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts and all reasonable inferences 
1 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Surety Underwriters v. E 
& C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, U 10 P.3d 338. 
As explained below, this matter is before the Court in the context of cross-motions 
for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Charlesworths' motion for summary 
judgment on four of their affirmative claims (breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, 
conversion, and constructive trust). The trial court denied the Reynses' cross-motion for 
summary judgment, which cross motion contended that the Charles worths' affirmative 
claims failed for lack of satisfying a supposed prerequisite of an accounting and because 
the claims were in any event barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. 
The Reynses have appealed the denial of their cross-motion. They appeal the trial 
court's entry of summary judgment on the Charles worths' affirmative claims, but only to 
the extent of the Reynses' contention that those claims are barred by a failure to obtain an 
accounting and by the applicable statutes of limitation. The Reynses do not otherwise 
appeal the substantive propriety of the trial court's entry of summary judgment against 
them on the Charles worths' motion for summary judgment. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The statutes determinative of this appeal are provided in the Addendum attached 
to this brief at Tab A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Charlesworths and Defendant Reyns were partners, along with Ellen Isom. 
The sole asset of the partnership consisted of a small apartment complex, known as the 
2 
Charlesworth Court, located in Ogden, Utah. The Charlesworths contend that, among 
other things, Defendant Reyns breached contractual and fiduciary duties owed to them, 
and engaged in conversion, by clandestinely transferring the Charlesworths5 interest in 
the apartments into the Reyns Family Trust, later selling that interest to a third party, and 
retaining the Charlesworths' share of the proceeds, all unbeknownst to the Charlesworths. 
The Charlesworths contend that the Reynses affirmatively concealed their actions. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Upon learning of these misdeeds, the Charlesworths brought this action against 
Defendant Reyns individually, and against Defendants Reyns, Arie William Reyns, and 
Alan W. Reyns as joint trustees of the Reyns Family Trust. The Charlesworths variously 
asserted the following claims in their Amended Complaint against the Reynses: (1) 
breach of written contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) mesne profits; (5) conversion; (6) fraud; (7) 
conspiracy to convert and defraud; (8) fraudulent conveyance; and (9) accounting and 
constructive trust. (R. at 33-34, 42-51.) 
After conducting discovery, the Charlesworths moved for summary judgment on 
four of their claims: the first, breach of contract; the third, breach of fiduciary duty; the 
fifth, conversion; and a portion of the ninth, constructive trust. (Id. at 178-80.) The 
Reynses filed a cross-motion for summary judgment asserting that all of the 
Charlesworths' claims were time barred. (Id. at 336-37.) After extensive briefing and 
oral argument, the trial court granted the Charlesworths' motion, and denied the Reynses' 
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cross-motion, as a matter of law in a Ruling, which was later memorialized in a detailed 
Order dated September 25, 2002. (Id. at 492-96, 506-33.) 
Thereafter, in an effort to streamline the matter and bring it to conclusion, the 
Charlesworths moved the trial court to dismiss the claims and defendants that were not 
the subject of the summary judgment order, with prejudice, and to enter judgment. (Id. at 
539-47.) Importantly, the Reynses did not oppose this motion or the form of the 
accompanying proposed order of dismissal or the form of the proposed judgment. 
On May 4, 2004, based on the Charlesworths' unopposed motion, the trial court 
entered an order dismissing the claims and the parties that were not the subject of the 
summary judgment order. (Id. at 568-71.) On the same day, the court entered Judgment 
in favor of the Charlesworths and against Defendant Reyns, individually, and against 
Defendants Reyns, Arie William Reyns, and Alan W. Reyns as joint trustees of the Reyns 
Family Trust, jointly and severally, in the principal sum of $116,666.67, together with 
pre- and post-judgment interest on that sum. (Id. at 572-75.) The Court further imposed 
a constructive trust on the proceeds of the sale of the Charlesworth Court apartments that 
were paid to the Reyns Family Trust. (Id. at 574.) The Reynses appeal from this 
Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the factual statement of Appellees' opening brief, the Reynses claim that the 
trial court mistakenly concluded that the material facts were undisputed for purposes of 
summary judgment. (Appellees' Br. at 6.) However, a review of the facts submitted to 
the trial court demonstrates that the Reynses failed to contest the vast majority of the 
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Charlewsorths' statements of fact in any way. In fact, the Reynses specifically admitted 
the majority of those facts for purposes of summary judgment. Even those few facts that 
the Reynses purported to dispute in their summary judgment memoranda do not in fact 
create a material issue of disputed fact. To illustrate these points, and for the 
convenience of the Court, the Charlesworths have attached to this brief at Tab B to the 
Addendum a chart containing the parties' statements of fact submitted in their summary 
judgment briefing to the trial court. Below is a streamlined version of those facts as they 
pertain to this appeal. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter involves an arrangement created in 1963 by Ben and Margaret 
Charles worth ("Mr. and Mrs. Charles worth") for two of their children and for certain of 
their grandchildren. Under this plan, their daughter Defendant Reyns, their daughter 
Ellen Isom ("Isom"), and the then-minor children of their son Jack Charlesworth (the 
Charlesworths), with his wife Shirlie Charlesworth acting as the children's trustee, 
formed a partnership called Ruell Investment Co. (the "Partnership") and purchased an 
apartment complex in Ogden, Utah, owned by Mr. and Mrs. Charlesworth 
("Charlesworth Court" or the "apartments"). Reyns, Isom, and the children (originally 
through their mother as trustee and later directly), each owned a one-third share in the 
Partnership, the principal assets of which were the apartments and the contract through 
which they were purchased. This relationship was created by three primary documents, 
all executed on March 22, 1963: a contract, a partnership agreement, and a trust 
agreement. Each is explained below. 
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II. THE CONTRACT 
On March 22, 1963, Reyns and Isom entered into a contract for the purchase of the 
apartments from Mr. and Mrs. Charlesworth (the "Contract"). (R. at 187-88, 34-35, 64-
65, 139, 214-17, 223.) Pursuant to the terms thereof, Reyns held a two-thirds interest in 
the Contract, and Isom held a one-third interest in the Contract. {Id. at 188, 215, 139.) 
However, the Contract expressly permitted Reyns to convey one-half of her interest 
therein to Shirlie Charlesworth in trust for the benefit of her children. {Id. at 188, 217.) 
III. THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 
Also on March 22, 1963, Reyns and Isom entered into an agreement creating the 
Partnership (the "Partnership Agreement"). {Id. at 188, 35, 65, 139, 227-28, 223.) As 
their initial capital contributions to the Partnership, Reyns and Isom each assigned their 
respective interests in the Contract to the Partnership. {Id. at 189, 139.) The Partnership 
Agreement expressly stated Reyns's intent to transfer one-half of her interest in the 
Contract to Shirlie Charlesworth (as trustee for her children). {Id. at 189, 227.) The 
Partnership Agreement also documented Reyns and Isom's consent to the transfer and 
provided that Shirlie Charlesworth would take her interest as trustee subject to the 
Partnership Agreement. {Id.) The Partnership Agreement specifically provided that, 
after the transfer, Reyns, Isom, and the trustee would each own one-third of the Contract. 
(Id.) 
Reyns was designated the managing partner, and was required to operate and 
manage the property, collect rents from tenants, keep financial records, not commingle 
partnership funds with any other funds, and at least annually disburse profits in excess of 
6 
the obligations of the Partnership (including its payment obligations under the Contract) 
to the partners according to their respective interests in the Partnership. {Id. at 188-89, 
227-28, 5, 139.) However, Reyns was given the discretion to determine the portion of 
profits to be distributed and the portion to be retained by the Partnership. {Id. at 189, 
228.) During the entirety of the Partnership, the Contract (until it was paid off) and the 
Property purchased thereunder were the Partnership's principal assets. {Id. at 189, 139.) 
IV. THE TRUST AGREEMENT 
As contemplated by the Contract and the Partnership Agreement, Reyns 
transferred one-half of her interest in the Contract to Shirlie Charlesworth, as trustee, 
through a Trust Agreement and Contract Assignment, which was also executed March 
22, 1963 (the "Trust Agreement"). {Id. at 189, 230-33, 223.) The Trust Agreement 
stated that by accepting the trust and the rights and duties of trustee, Shirlie Charlesworth, 
as trustee, became a partner in the Partnership, owning an equal one-third interest. {Id. at 
190, 230.) The Trust Agreement further provided that as a result of the assignment, 
Reyns, Isom, and Shirlie Charlesworth as trustee, each owned an undivided one-third 
interest in the Contract. {Id. at 189, 230.) 
The trust was to terminate by its own terms upon the happening of certain 
contingencies, including the satisfaction of the payment obligations under the Contract 
and/or when the beneficiaries attained their majority. {Id. at 190, 231.) Regardless of 
how the Trust was to terminate, the end result was that the beneficiaries or the heirs of 
any non-surviving beneficiaries were to own, among other things, their respective 
portions of the trust principal. {Id.) As it turned out, the payment obligation under the 
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Contract was not satisfied until after all of the beneficiaries turned 21. (Id. at 190, 236-
37, 38, 68, 139.) In that instance, "all allocated income and all of the interest in the trust 
principal shall be or have been distributed to the beneficiaries free and clear of the trust." 
(Id. at 190, 231 (emphasis added).) Thus, as the Charlesworths attained their majority, 
the Trust Agreement by its terms terminated as to them and they owned their share of the 
trust principal, i.e., the Partnership, directly. (Id. at 373.) Reyns recognized this fact by 
making distributions directly to the Charlesworths once they had attained their majority 
and by reciting that they were partners in the Federal Schedule K-ls she sent them. (Id.) 
Given that the Charlesworths owned their interest in the Partnership directly, and the 
Trust Agreement had terminated by its own terms, Shirlie Charlesworth's duty to protect 
her children's interest in the trust extinguished.1 
V. ESCROW DOCUMENTS 
The Contract required several documents to be placed in escrow at Commercial 
Security Bank in Ogden, Utah, including the following: a copy of the Contract; an 
escrow agreement executed contemporaneously with the Contract; and a Warranty Deed 
1
 Shirlie Charlesworth testified in her deposition that the entire arrangement concerning 
the Partnership, the Contract, and the Trust Agreement had been set up by Mr. 
Charlesworth and his lawyer, and that she did not participate in the arrangements. Mr. 
Charlesworth presented her with the Trust Agreement in his lawyer's office, and 
explained to her that the arrangement was for his grandchildren, to help with college. He 
further explained that the Charlesworths would own one-third of the apartments. He then 
asked Shirlie to sign the Trust Agreement, and she gratefully did. Mr. Charlesworth did 
not show her any other documents related to the transaction, such as the Partnership 
Agreement or the Quitclaim Deed. Specifically, Shirlie Charlesworth was never aware of 
the existence of the Quitclaim Deed until around the time this suit was filed. (Id. at 373-
74.) 
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to the Property, conveying the Property from Mr. and Mrs. Charles worth to Reyns and 
Isom, which Warranty Deed was to be delivered to Reyns and Isom upon completion of 
the payments required under the Contract. (Id. at 190, 216-17, 35, 65, 139.) 
The Contract further provided that, in the event Reyns conveyed one-half of her 
interest in the Contract to Shirlie Charlesworth, as trustee, prior to the delivery of the 
documents in escrow to Reyns and Isom - which Reyns did - "the trust deed from . . . 
Reyns to Shirlee [sic] Charlesworth shall also be deposited in escrow and held by the 
escrow agent until the total purchase price has been paid in full." (Id. at 191, 217.) The 
Trust Agreement echoed and clarified the Contract's dictate. The Trust Agreement 
provided: "To further carry out this assignment the Settlor [Reyns] has executed her Quit 
Claim Deed to an undivided one-third of the trust property in favor of Trustee [Shirlie 
Charlesworth], which deed shall be deposited in escrow with the escrow holder named in 
the contract assigned and held by it until the contract principal is paid in full, at which 
time it will be delivered by the escrow holder to the Trustee and by her recorded." (Id. at 
191,233.) 
Consistent with the Contract and the Trust Agreement, the Escrow Agreement 
provided that when the Contract purchase price was paid in full, the Warranty Deed 
conveying the Property from Mr. and Mrs. Charlesworth to Reyns and Isom shall be 
delivered to Reyns and Isom, and "the Quit Claim Deed from Ruth C. Reyns to Shirlee 
[sic] Charlesworth . . . shall be delivered to the Grantee therein," namely Shirlie 
Charlesworth. (Id. at 191, 221, 240.) 
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The Quit Claim Deed bears Reyns's signature. In that Deed, Reyns grants an 
undivided one-third interest in the Property such that, after recordation of the Quit Claim 
Deed, the Property will be owned "an undivided one-third by RUTH C. REYNS, an 
undivided one-third by ELLEN C. ISOM, an undivided one-third by SHIRLEE [sic] 
CHARLES WORTH, TRUSTEE, as tenants in common." (Id at 192, 220-21, 244-45.) 
The Contract purchase price was paid in full on or about October 6, 1983. (Id. at 
192, 38, 68, 139.) At that time, the Warranty Deed was delivered to Reyns. (Id. at 192, 
247-48.) The Quit Claim Deed was also delivered to Reyns. (Id. at 192, 222, 258, 249.)2 
Shirlie Charlesworth and the children never received the Quit Claim Deed. (Id. at 193, 
296-97,238.) 
VI. HISTORY OF PARTNERSHIP DISTRIBUTIONS 
For twenty years, Reyns paid the net profits from the apartments, if any, to the 
partners annually. (Id. at 193, 38, 68.) Reyns paid one-third of the profits to herself, one-
third to Isom (and later to her heirs), and one-third to the children. Initially, Reyns 
delivered the Charlesworths' portion of the profits to Shirlie Charlesworth's husband, 
who would deliver the payments to the children. Reyns began to deliver the payments 
2
 For the first time in this action, the Reynses suggest in their Appellants' Brief that this 
fact was disputed. However, the Charlesworths made that assertion in the fact statement 
of their memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment, and the 
Reynses failed to contest it in any way in their opposing memorandum. (R. at 192, 339, 
341.) Thus, it is deemed admitted. Moreover, given Reyns's inability to recall whether 
or not she received the Quit Claim Deed, and the fact that her authenticated signature on 
the escrow receipt evidences such receipt, (id. at 249), Reyns cannot seriously contest 
that she received the Quit Claim Deed, and has failed to point to any evidence of record 
suggesting that she did not. 
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directly to the children as they respectively reached their majority. Reyns continued 
making payments to the children until at least 1985 - over ten years after the youngest 
child had attained his majority and sixteen years after the oldest child had attained his 
majority. {Id. at 193, 251-56, 292.) 
Even though she ceased making outright payments to the children, Reyns 
continued to send them Schedules K-l of Form 1065, titled "Partner's Share of Income, 
Credits, Deductions, Etc.," which reflected income or losses to the children in the form of 
increased or decreased capital accounts and also expressly recited their status as "general 
partners" in the Partnership. {Id. at 193, 256-57, 299-320.) Reyns provided Schedule K-
1 tax statements to the partners, including each of the Plaintiffs, from the inception of the 
Partnership through the 1992 tax year. {Id. at 194, 264-77, 299-320.) The K-ls also 
reflected that each of the Plaintiffs owned one-fifth of one-third (6.67%) of the profits, 
losses, and ownership of capital of the Partnership. {Id.) 
In connection with the preparation of the Partnership's 1992 tax return, Reyns 
recalls having a discussion with the Partnership's accountant about whether the 
Charlesworths were general partners of the Partnership. She cannot recall the content of 
the conversation, however the accountant thereafter prepared the returns in a manner 
expressly reflecting the Charlesworths' interest as general partners, and Reyns delivered 
the returns to them. {Id. at 194-95, 270-72.) 
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VII. REYNS'S CLANDESTINE TRANSFER OF THE CHARLESWORTHS' 
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY TO THE REYNS FAMILY TRUST 
On August 27, 1985, notwithstanding the Charles worths' interest in the 
Partnership, Reyns conveyed by warranty deed a two-thirds interest in the Property to 
herself, Arie William Reyns, and Alan W. Reyns, as joint trustees under the Reyns 
Family Trust. (Id. at 195, 323-24, 141-42.) The warranty deed was recorded with the 
Weber County Recorder. (Id. at 342.) The joint trustees under the Reyns Family Trust 
tendered no consideration to the Partnership in connection with the transfer. (Id. at 195, 
39, 69.) 
Notwithstanding the requirement in the Partnership Agreement that the 
Partnership Agreement not be modified absent the consent of all of the parties thereto and 
their successors, Reyns did not obtain authorization from anyone to make the transfer. 
(Id. at 195, 228, 142.) Reyns did not give Shirlie Charlesworth or the children notice of 
the transfer. (Id. at 195.) In fact, notwithstanding the transfer, Reyns continued to 
provide Schedule K-ls to the children, which Schedules reflected the children's 
continued interest in the Partnership, the principal assets of which were the Contract and 
the Property purchased thereunder. (Id. at 194, 195, 264-77.) 
The transfer did not affect Isom's one-third interest in the Partnership Property. 
Isom retained her one-third interest in the Property after Reyns transferred the other two-
thirds interest in the Partnership Property to the Reyns Family Trust. (Id. at 196, 143.) 
Isom died in 1988, causing a dissolution of the Partnership, however the partnership was 
not wound up. On January 4, 1990, Isom's personal representative and former husband, 
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Raymond Isom, executed a deed transferring Isom's one-third interest in the Property to 
Raymond Isom, Patrick Isom, and Colleen Findley. (Id. at 196, 40, 70.) 
VIII. SALE OF THE PROPERTY UNBEKNOWNST TO THE 
CHARLESWORTHS 
On or about June 6, 1996, the joint trustees of the Reyns Family Trust and 
Raymond Isom, respectively, sold and conveyed the entire Property to third parties. (Id. 
at 196, 143, 325-30.) A counter offer included in the Real Estate Purchase Contract 
signed by Reyns and her husband Arie William Reyns indicated that that the seller was "a 
partnership," namely "Ruell Investments," and clarified that the sale was "subject to the 
approval of all partners." (Id. at 196, 285-87, 329.) 
The Property was transferred to the buyers through warranty deeds, including a 
warranty deed executed by Reyns, Arie William Reyns, and Alan W. Reyns, as trustees 
of the Reyns Family Trust. (Id. at 197, 289-91, 332-35.) 
The joint trustees of the Reyns Family Trust, Raymond Isom, Patrick Isom, and 
Colleen Findley together received consideration from the purchasers of the Property of 
$350,000, including cash in the amount of $297,500 and a promissory note in the amount 
of $52,500. One-third of the $297,000 cash payment was paid to the Isoms, and the 
remainder was paid to the Reyns Family Trust. The buyers later paid the balance of the 
purchase price, namely $52,500. The $52,500 was distributed to the Isoms and the Reyns 
Family Trust in the same proportion as the initial cash payment, namely one-third of the 
payment was made to the Isoms and two-thirds was made to the Reyns Family Trust. (Id. 
at 197, 273, 280-82, 325.) 
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The joint trustees of the Reyns Family Trust did not obtain authorization from the 
Plaintiffs to make this transfer of the Property. (Id. at 197, 41, 71, 282.) Reyns never 
gave Shirlie Charlesworth or the Charlesworths notice of the sale of the Property. (Id. at 
197, 284-85.) Plaintiffs did not learn of the sale until the summer of 1997. (Id. at 197, 
295.) The Reynses have never paid any of the sale proceeds of the Property to the 
Charlesworths. (Id. at 197, 42, 72.) 
IX. THE CHARLESWORTHS WERE UNAWARE OF DEFENDANT REYNS'S 
TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY AND THE REYNSES 
AFFIRMATIVELY DECEIVED THE CHARLESWORTHS INTO 
BELIEVING THAT THE STATUS QUO PREVAILED 
The annual partnership distributions continued through at least 1985, which is over 
ten years after the youngest of the Charlesworths turned 21. After 1985, the cash 
distributions to the Charlesworths largely ceased. However, from that time forward, 
there nevertheless were one or two additional cash distributions. (Id. at 341-42, 374-75, 
421, 433, 445, 457, 469.)3 
Although actual cash distributions ceased over time, Reyns continued sending the 
Charlesworths Schedule K-ls. These forms continued to expressly state that the 
Charlesworths were partners in the Partnership. The forms also reflected each of the 
Charlesworths' share of Partnership distributions for the year. In some years, the forms 
3
 In their Appellees' Brief, the Reynses take issue with the trial court's finding that it is 
undisputed that after 1985 Reyns made one or two cash payments to the Charlesworths. 
(Appellees' Br. at 14 n.2.) The Reynses cite a portion of Rennly Charlesworth's 
deposition to support this claim. (Id.) However, this portion of his transcript on its face 
does not preclude this possibility. Moreover, the Reynses ignore the affidavits 
submitted by the remaining Charlesworths, each of which state that there were one or 
two cash distributions after that time. (R. at 421, 445, 457, 469.) 
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reflected income to the Charles worths. In other years, they reflected a loss. Such income 
or loss was reflected in the Charles worths' Partnership capital account balance reported 
on the Schedule K-1, which resulted in reportable ordinary income or losses. {Id. at 377-
78; see, e.g., id. at 422.) Importantly, these statements were delivered annually to the 
Charlesworths through the 1992 tax year, which form was delivered in 1993. {Id. at 379; 
see, e.g., id. at 423.) 
Isom passed away in 1988. The Charlesworths understood that certain of Isom's 
family members, including Raymond E. Isom, Patrick Isom, and Colleen Ruth Isom 
Findley, inherited or otherwise took control of Isom's one-third interest in the 
Partnership, and the Partnership continued. From that time forward, the Charlesworths 
understood that Reyns distributed one-third of the partnership income and losses to these 
members of Isom's family. {Id. at 378; see, e.g., id. at 422.) 
In or around the fall of 1988, the Charlesworths observed that their annual cash 
distributions had ceased. Accordingly, Plaintiff GayLee McEwan, now known as 
GayLee Drezin, wrote a letter to Reyns seeking an explanation. In response, the 
Charlesworths received a letter from Defendant Arie William Reyns. The letter was 
dated December 9, 1988. As expressed in this letter, Mr. Reyns apparently took offense 
at the contents of GayLee's letter. Nevertheless, Mr. Reyns's letter contained a fair 
amount of detail. It explained that property taxes and maintenance costs had been rising. 
It also stated that, in light of federal low-income housing being built in the area, Mr. 
Reyns had to lower the rent for the Property. Finally, the letter disclosed to the 
Charlesworths that he was attempting to sell the Property, but had not received any 
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serious offers. (Id. at 378, 440.) The explanation in the letter seemed reasonable and 
adequate to the Charles worths. Therefore, they did not inquire of the Reynses any further 
concerning the matter. (Id. at 378; see, e.g., id. at 422.) 
Subsequently, approximately one year later, the Charlesworths received another 
letter from Mr. Reyns's husband concerning the Property. This letter was dated 
December 10, 1989. This letter similarly stated that the Partnership had incurred 
significant maintenance costs, and that the Property was experiencing a very high 
vacancy rate. The letter also noted that the Property was still for sale, but that no one had 
made any offers to purchase it. (Id. at 378-79, 466.) 
The December 10 letter also confirmed the Charlesworths' understanding that the 
Partnership continued after Isom's death. For example, the letter indicated that the 
Property was still being maintained and rented. The letter also indicated that the 
Partnership had taken out a loan that would be payable over the following four years. It 
also specifically noted: "The law here required us to have the property appraised after 
[Isom's] death for probate. This cost is $600.00, and is paid for, however it is an expense 
that has to be shared." (Id. at 379, 466.) Thus, it indicated that the Charlesworths would 
continue to share in the costs borne by the Partnership. (Id. at 379; see, e.g., id. at 423.) 
The Charlesworths also recall receiving, from time to time, additional letters or 
notes from Defendant Reyns or her husband explaining the amount of their Partnership 
distributions. These communications often indicated that the distributions were small in 
light of the cost of maintaining the Property. (Id.) During this time, and thereafter, the 
Charlesworths continued to receive Schedule K-ls from Defendant Reyns. The K-ls 
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expressly recited that they were partners in the Partnership. They also reflected income 
and losses added to or subtracted from their Partnership capital accounts. (Id.) 
Reyns sent the Schedule K-ls for each tax year through and including 1992. The 
Schedule K-l for the tax year 1992 was sent to Plaintiffs in 1993. As of September of 
1994, Plaintiffs had not received the Schedule K-l for the 1993 tax year. At that time, 
Plaintiff Rennly Charlesworth phoned Reyns and inquired as to when the Charlesworths 
would be receiving their Schedule K-ls. During that telephone conversation, Defendant 
Reyns informed Mr. Charlesworth that the Partnership was "over." (Id. at 379-80; see, 
e.g., id. at 423-24.) 
Prior to that time, neither Defendant Reyns nor anyone else had ever indicated to 
the Charlesworths in any manner, either outright or by implication, nor did the 
Charlesworths otherwise know or suspect, or have reason to know or suspect, that she or 
anyone else considered the Partnership "over," or that she was terminating, attempting to 
terminate, or had terminated the Partnership or their interest in the Partnership. To the 
contrary, she had indicated that the Plaintiffs were partners in the Partnership by sending 
them Schedule K-ls that reflected their partnership status. (Id. at 380; see, e.g., id. at 
424.) 
Subsequently, in the summer of 1997, and only after Plaintiff Rennly 
Charlesworth contacted a lawyer, the Charlesworths learned that Defendant Reyns had 
sold the Property. The Charlesworths also learned that Defendant Reyns kept two-thirds 
of the proceeds from this sale, and that she distributed the remaining one-third of the 
proceeds from the sale to the Isom family. (Id. at 380; see e.g., id. at 424.) 
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Prior to discovering that Defendant Reyns had sold the Property, neither she nor 
anyone else had ever indicated to the Charlesworths in any manner, either outright or by 
implication, nor did the Charlesworths otherwise know or suspect, nor have reason to 
know or suspect, that the Property had been sold, that the owners of the Property had 
changed in any manner, that Defendant Reyns or anyone else owned or claimed to own 
the Property separate and apart from the Partnership, that Defendant Reyns had executed 
and recorded deeds concerning the Property, or that she or anyone else claimed that the 
Charlesworths no longer had an ownership interest in the Property. (Id. at 380; see, e.g., 
id. at 424.) 
Among other things, in light of the fact that Defendant Reyns is the Plaintiffs' 
aunt, in light of the fact that they therefore trusted her integrity implicitly, in light of the 
explanations they received concerning the amount of the Partnership distributions, in 
light of the fact that they had received annual distributions (either outright or as stated in 
a Schedule K-l) for over two decades, and in light of the Schedule K-ls that they 
received each year from Defendant Reyns that expressly recited their Partnership status 
and their share of Partnership profits and losses, the Plaintiffs never knew or suspected, 
nor did they have reason to know or suspect, that Defendant Reyns considered the 
Partnership to be "over." For these same reasons, the Plaintiffs never suspected, nor did 
they have reason to suspect, that Defendant Reyns had executed and recorded 
conveyances concerning the Property, or that she had sold the Property and distributed 
the proceeds of the sale. Similarly, in light of the fact that she apprised the Charlesworths 
18 
of her efforts to sell the Property, the Charlesworths presumed she would apprise them if 
in fact she found a buyer. {Id. at 381; see, e.g., id. at 425.) 
Except as described below, none of the Charlesworths was ever shown, nor were 
they privy to, any of the documents or deeds governing or related to the creation of the 
Partnership, the purchase of the Property, or the Trust Agreement concerning the same. 
In reviewing his father's papers in or around 1985 to 1988 after his father had passed 
away, which was a very emotional time for him, Rennly Charlesworth came across an 
apparent draft of what he now believes was the Partnership Agreement. It was on onion 
skin paper and was almost illegible, and it was also unsigned. He therefore did not, and 
could not for the most part, review its terms. {Id. at 381-82; see, e.g., id. at 425.)4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
For almost thirty years, Reyns distributed the profits realized from renting the 
apartments to her partners, including the Charlesworths. She distributed one-third of the 
profits to herself, one-third to Isom, and the remaining one-third first to the 
Charlesworths' parents on their behalf and later to the Charlesworths directly as they 
attained their majority. Reyns also specifically acknowledged the partnership interests of 
Isom and the Charlesworths by sending them partnership tax returns that expressly 
reflected their status as general partners, and by making distributions of profits, either in 
4
 The Reynses asserted below that Rennly Charlesworth understood that he was to have 
received an annual accounting concerning the Partnership's affairs. This claimed 
understanding, however, was held by Mr. Charlesworth only at the time he was deposed 
in this action. (R. at 344-45, 376, 438.) 
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cash or as reflected in adjustments to the partners' capital accounts on the partnership tax 
returns. 
Nevertheless, and without notice to the Chariesworths, Reyns transferred their 
interest in the Partnership to her family trust. Thereafter, Reyns made at least one cash 
distribution and also continued to send federal tax forms to the Chariesworths on an 
annual basis, which recited their status as partners, and made distributions or assessed 
losses to them by virtue of adjustments to their capital accounts in the Partnership. In 
addition, in response to inquiries from the Chariesworths concerning the small amount of 
these distributions, the Reynses gave credible explanations about maintenance costs of 
the aging apartments. These acts not only continued the Partnership, they concealed 
Reynses actions. Therefore, at all times, the Reynses gave the appearance that the 
Partnership, and the Chariesworths' interests therein, continued. 
When Rennly Charlesworth failed to receive his Schedule K-l for the 1993 tax 
year in 1994, he inquired of Reyns. At that time, in September of 1994, she informed 
him that the partnership was "over." Later, in 1996, without notice to the Chariesworths, 
the Reynses and Isoms sold the apartment complex outright to a third party, but have 
refused to turn over one-third of the proceeds to the children. The Reynses provided one-
third of the proceeds to Isom's heirs, but kept the remaining two-thirds for their family 
trust. 
The Reynses do not appeal the trial court's determination that the above acts 
constitute breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion, and warrant the 
imposition of a constructive trust. They simply argue that the Chariesworths failed to 
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seek an accounting prior to bringing this action, and that they filed the action outside the 
applicable limitations periods. The Reynses do not otherwise contest the Charles worths' 
entitlement to relief. 
Although an accounting is generally required as a prerequisite to an intra-
partnership action, that requirement is not absolute. As a practical matter, no accounting 
is necessary here because the Partnership held one asset. Thus, it is a simple matter to 
determine each partner's interest in the partnership. In addition, this Court has expressly 
acknowledged that where a partner wrongfully dissolves a partnership and converts its 
assets, the excluded partner may sue for specific performance and an accounting, or may 
sue for damages. Thus, an accounting is not the only remedy allowed a partner. 
As to the limitations periods, the Reynses' actions, as well as exceptional 
circumstances, operated to toll them. The Reynses concealed the true state of affairs until 
the fall of 1994. Only at that time were the Charleworths put on notice, inquiry or 
otherwise, that Reyns was acting inconsistently with her duties to the Partnership. The 
Charlesworths filed this action in June of 1997, which is within the limitations period of 
all of the claims on which they prevailed on summary judgment. Accordingly, the trial 
court correctly entered summary judgment for the Charlesworths. This Court should 
affirm that decision. 
ARGUMENT 
The only issues before this Court are whether a partnership accounting is a 
prerequisite to the Charlesworths' action, and whether the Charlesworths' claims are 
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barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. Under the facts of this case, and 
applicable law, these technicalities do not bar the Charlesworths' claims. 
I. THE REYNSES DO NOT CONTEST LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND CONVERSION, OR 
THE PROPRIETY OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, OTHER THAN TO 
ARGUE THEIR DEFENSES OF AN ALLEGED ACCOUNTING 
PREREQUISITE AND THE APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION 
The Reynses does not contest that Reyns, as a matter of law, owed contractual and 
fiduciary duties to the Charlesworths as partners in the Partnership. Similarly, the 
Reynses do not contest that Reyns, as a matter of law, breached those contractual and 
fiduciary duties in failing to distribute to the Charlesworths their share of the profits 
realized from the sale of the Property. They also do not contest that her actions constitute 
conversion. The Reynses further do not contest that, as a matter of law, the 
circumstances warrant imposition of a constructive trust. In sum, they do not challenge 
the Charlesworths' substantive entitlement to relief in this action. 
Instead, they claim that such relief is prohibited solely on the grounds that an 
accounting is a prerequisite to an intra-partnership suit, and that the Charlesworths' 
affirmative claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. As demonstrated 
below, neither is the case. Accordingly, the Court should affirm the trial court's decision. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT AN 
ACCOUNTING IS NOT A PREREQUISITE TO THIS ACTION AS A 
MATTER OF LAW 
A. Well-Accepted Law Provides Exceptions to the General Rule 
Requiring an Accounting as a Prerequisite to an Intra-Partnership Suit 
The Reynses cite authority stating the general rule that a formal accounting is a 
prerequisite to an intra-partnership action. (Appellees' Br. at 29-31.) However, the very 
cases that the Reynses cite for this proposition acknowledge that an accounting is not 
always a prerequisite to a suit between partners. For example, Durham v. Southwest 
Developers, 996 P.2d 911 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999), observes that the rationale for the 
general rule is a practical one. In many partnerships, it is impossible to determine a 
partner's interest until there is a full settling of partnership accounts. Id. at 918-19. For 
example, another case cited by the Reynses held that an accounting was a prerequisite to 
suit between partners where the partnership involved a "multitude of transactions" and a 
"complexity of accounts." Cornell & Co. v. Pace, 703 S.W.2d 398,403 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1986). 
In yet another case cited by the Reynses, this Court expressly acknowledged that 
where a partner wrongfully dissolves a partnership and converts its assets, as here, the 
excluded partner may sue for specific performance and an accounting, or may sue for 
damages. Wanlass v. D Land Title, 790 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing 
Jeaness v. Besnilian, 706 P.2d 143 (Nev. 1985)). 
Reported cases throughout the country are in accord. For example, in Battles v. 
LaSalle National Bank, 608 N.E.2d 438 (111. Ct. App. 1992), the court considered 
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"whether a partner may sue another partner without requesting a final accounting where 
the damages sought were for breach of fiduciary duty in disposing of partnership [real] 
property." Id. at 440. The court noted the general rule prohibiting suits between partners 
in the absence of an accounting. It observed, however, that there are "numerous 
exceptions to the rule that [make] the rule inapplicable." Id. at 444 (emphasis added). 
The rationale underlying the rule is that the resolution of disputes between partners 
often requires an accounting to determine whether the partner claiming an amount from a 
co-partner is not himself liable to the co-partner in connection with partnership debts. Id. 
Thus, where a suit may be resolved short of a full review of the partnership's accounts, an 
accounting is unnecessary. Id. Additionally, an accounting is not necessary "when the 
joint property has been wrongfully destroyed or converted or when one partner has been 
guilty of fraud that results in defeating the rights of the complaining party." Id. 
Courts around the nation have similarly held that there are exceptions to the 
general accounting-first rule in a variety of contexts, including where the partnership was 
limited to a single venture and there are no complex accounting issues, or where the 
defendant partner breached fiduciary duties or improperly used partnership assets. See, 
e.g., Sertich v. Moorman, 783 P.2d 1199, 1205 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc) (stating that case 
illustrates that continued enforcement of the accounting-first rule "is indeed illogical, 
impractical, and inequitable" and holding that the "general accounting requirement as a 
condition precedent to an action at law between partners or a partner and the partnership 
is abolished"); Laughlin v. Haberfelde, 165 P.2d 544, 548 (Cal. 1946) (accounting is not 
a prerequisite where acts of defendant partner constitute a tort, especially where such 
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wrongful acts destroy the partnership and where the erring partner converts partnership 
assets to his own use); Schreibman v. Zanetti, 909 S.W.2d 692, 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) 
(accounting not necessary in case involving breach of contract, breach of partnership, 
conversion, and fraud, even where statute requires accounting upon dissolution, where 
defendant partners denied existence of partnership); Hanes v. Giambrone, 471 N.E.2d 
801, 807 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (observing that "many courts" have held that an action at 
law may be maintained by one partner against another when no complex accounting 
involving a variety of partnership transactions is necessary); Mandrell v. McBee, 892 
S.W.2d 842, 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (exceptions to general accounting-first rule 
"when the lawsuit arises out of the breach of a partner's fiduciary obligations to the 
partnership, fraud, or the improper use of partnership funds"). 
Thus, as acknowledged by the Reynses' own authorities, by this Court, and by 
jurisdictions throughout the country, an accounting is not a prerequisite to an intra-
partnership action where the partnership at issue was simple in nature with simple 
accounts, or where the defendant has wrongfully repudiated the partnership and 
converted its assets. Both are the case in the instant matter. 
B. An Accounting Is Unnecessary Here as a Practical Matter 
1. An Accounting Is Unnecessary in Light of the Facts of This Case 
The Partnership had one asset: the Charlesworth Court apartments. (Appellees' 
Br. at 25 (describing apartments as "sole asset of the partnership").) The Partnership 
accounts were simple and consisted merely of incoming rent and maintenance and related 
costs. The capital accounts were settled each year in Schedule K-ls, which were 
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prepared by Reyns's own accountant and reflected each year's profit and losses. 
Moreoever, the Reynses have not asserted any claim of offset against the Charlesworths' 
claims, nor have they asserted any counterclaim in which they allege that they are entitled 
to any sums from the Charlesworths. (R. at 137-46.) Thus, in light of the above 
authorities, a formal accounting is not necessary to resolve the interests of the Partners. 
This case simply boils down to whether Plaintiffs are entitled to a one-third share 
of the proceeds realized from the sale of the Property. There is no dispute as to the 
amount for which the Property was sold, and the Reynses do not claim any setoffs or 
counterclaims. Thus, no accounting is necessary to resolve the matter. An accounting 
would be wasteful in this instance, which is why the exceptions to the general rule exist. 
2. An Action for Formal Accounting Was Timely Asserted and 
Would Have Produced the Same Result as Reached by the Trial 
Court 
Because, as explained below, the Partnership did not dissolve and/or a claim for an 
accounting did not accrue until 1994 when Reyns told the Charlesworths the Partnership 
was "over," the Charlesworths timely asserted a claim for an accounting. Even applying 
the shortest of the potentially applicable limitations periods to that claim, which the 
Reynses concede is four years, (Appellees' Br. at 32-33), the Charlesworths properly 
filed their claim in 1997. Moreover, an accounting would have produced the same result 
5
 The Reynses claim for the first time on this appeal that they were not credited with 
certain closing costs in the Judgment entered by the trial court, the form and entry of 
which they did not contest. This argument is addressed infra at Section IV. Even if the 
Court considers the Reynses' argument in this regard, it represents a simple, arithmetic 
deduction. 
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as reached by the trial court. The Charlesworths dismissed their claim for an accounting 
only after the trial court ruled that they had a one-third interest in the partnership and its 
proceeds. Given that the Property was the sole asset of the Partnership, and there were no 
other outstanding claims concerning partnership distributions, a formal accounting would 
have yielded the same result - the Charlesworths were entitled to a one-third interest in 
the Partnership and its proceeds. An accounting was thus unnecessary. 
The Reynses submit that the Charlesworths filed their claim for an accounting 
outside the limitations period, which the Reynses claim began variously in 1983, 1985, or 
1988. Specifically, the Reynses argue that the Partnership dissolved and/or that a claim 
for an accounting accrued in 1983 because the Partnership allegedly terminated by its 
terms upon completion of the payments required under the Contract, because the Trust 
Agreement terminated by its terms (which eliminated the partnership interest of those 
claiming through the trust), or because Reyns conveyed a two-thirds interest in the 
Property to herself, half of which was the Charlesworths' under the Partnership 
Agreement. The Reynses argue that the Partnership dissolved and/or a claim for an 
accounting accrued in 1985 because Reyns transferred the Charlesworths' interest to the 
Reyns Family Trust or because it allegedly was the last year the Charlesworths received a 
distribution. The Reynses argue that the Partnership also dissolved and/or a claim for an 
accounting accrued in 1988 when Isom passed away. (Appellees' Br. at 32.) 
None of these contentions is correct. The Partnership Agreement specifically 
stated that it may be modified by agreement of the parties. After the Contract was paid 
off in 1983, Reyns continued to run the Partnership. She continued to treat Isom and the 
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Charlesworths as partners. She paid them profits received from the partnership and sent 
the partners Schedule K-ls for twenty more years. Until Reyns sold the Property in 
1996, she made absolutely no effort to wind up the Partnership's affairs. To the contrary, 
Reyns affirmed and continued the Partnership by taking out a loan to repair the property 
payable over four years, which was one of several acts inconsistent with dissolved status. 
Thus, payment of the Contract did not work a dissolution. Similarly, the Trust 
Agreement expressly stated that, if the beneficiaries are twenty-one or more when the 
Contract is paid off, each beneficiary's "share of the trust principal as an undivided 
interest" "shall be transferred to him." Thus, the terms of the trust automatically vested a 
Partnership interest in the Charlesworths. Also, the fact that Reyns recorded the two-
thirds interest in her name did not work a dissolution. First, Partnership property may be 
held in the name of one or more of the individual partners. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-7. 
Second, the Charlesworths were completely unaware of this fact. As a case cited by the 
Reynses acknowledges, the limitations period for a cause of action for an accounting does 
not begin to run until the party in whom the cause of action vests becomes aware of the 
events giving rise to the cause of action. Durham, 996 P.2d at 919 (statute of limitations 
on accounting action did not run against party unaware of event giving rise to 
dissolution). Thus, the mere fact that the Property was held in the name of only some of 
the partners did not work a dissolution and/or did not trigger a claim for an accounting. 
Therefore, none of the events occurring in 1983 worked a dissolution or triggered an 
action for an accounting. 
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Reyns's transfer of the Charlesworths' interest in the Property to the Reyns Family 
Trust in 1985 similarly did not trigger an action for an accounting. The Charlesworths 
had no notice that Reyns had made this transfer. The Reynses also claim that no 
Partnership distributions were made after 1985. This is contrary to the undisputed record. 
Not only did Reyns make one or two cash distributions after that date, but she also made 
distributions for almost a decade thereafter by distributing profits and losses by making 
adjustments to the Charlesworths' capital accounts. Therefore, the events occurring in 
1985 did not trigger an action for an accounting either. 
Finally, the Reynses argue that Isom's death in 1988 worked a dissolution of the 
Partnership. However, the Utah Uniform Partnership Act contemplates the continuation 
of a partnership after the death of a partner. It specifically provides for the rights of the 
estate of a deceased partner when the business is continued after the death of the partner. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-39. The Wanlass decision of this Court, which the Reynses cite, 
similarly recognizes that, upon agreement of the parties, a partnership may continue after 
an event that would normally result in dissolution. 790 P.2d at 570-71 (citing Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 48-1-34, -39, -40). In its analysis, the Court observed that, at the time of 
dissolution occasioned by the death of a partner, the deceased partner's estate is entitled 
to the deceased partner's share "or a share in the continued partnership." Id. at 571. 
As permitted by statute, and acknowledged in Wanlass, the Partnership in this case 
continued after Isom's death. The Partnership conducted business as usual after her 
death, without any winding up or settlement of accounts between the partners. Reyns 
continued to operate the apartments and collect rent. Reyns continued to send the 
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partners Schedule K-ls expressly acknowledging that she, Isom's heirs, and the 
Charlesworths were partners in the Partnership, and reflecting distributions in the form of 
adjustments to their respective capital accounts. The Property was still maintained and 
being rented just as it was before Isom's death. Reyns and her husband also sent letters 
to the Charlesworths describing the maintenance of the apartments and the reasons why 
the Partnership distributions were so small. Importantly, one of these letters indicated 
that the Partnership had taken out a new loan that would be payable over a four year 
period. These undisputed facts demonstrate that the Partnership continued after Isom's 
death. As permitted in the Uniform Partnership Act, Isom's heirs accepted a share in the 
continued partnership. Wanlass, 790 P.2d at 571. Moreover, after Isom's death, the 
Partnership became obligated to repay a loan concerning the Property. The fact that the 
Partnership took on this new obligation after Isom's death without doubt shows that the 
Partnership continued. Accordingly, the events of 1988 did not trigger a cause of action 
for an accounting. 
Because no action for an accounting was triggered until 1994, the Charlesworths 
timely filed their claim for an accounting. When that claim became superfluous, the 
Charlesworths dismissed it so as to minimize costs to the parties and the Court, and assist 
in obtaining a resolution of the matter. Given that the Property constituted the sole asset 
of the Partnership, and that the Reynses had not asserted or suggested that any sums 
should be deducted from the Charlesworths' one-third share of the proceeds of the 
Property, the accounting claim was unnecessary. 
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C\ An Accounting Is Also Unnecessary Here Because Reyns Wrongfully 
Dissolved the Partnership 
Further, the Reynses have not contested that Reyns breached the Partnership 
Agreement, breached her fiduciary duties, and converted Partnership property. As 
indicated above, in such instances an accounting is not required. This Court has ruled 
that, where a partnership is wrongfully dissolved, an accounting is unnecessary. See, e.g., 
Wanlass, 790 P.2d at 572 (aggrieved party may forego accounting remedy in case of 
wrongful repudiation of partnership and sue for damages). 
The Reynses argue that a party must first seek an accounting before the party may 
object to the distribution of partnership assets, even where those assets have been 
converted. They cite Wanlass as authority for this proposition. (Appellees' Br. at 28-29.) 
In doing so, however, they ignore the context of the Wanlass decision. It is correct, as 
the Reynses observe, that this Court held that the aggrieved party in Wanlass must obtain 
an accounting before pursuing other remedies. 790 P.2d at 572. However, the Court 
specifically observed that its holding was based on the fact that the partnership at issue 
had not been wrongfully dissolved. Instead, it was dissolved by operation of law upon 
the death of a partner. Id. Upon the death of the partner, the remaining partner and the 
deceased partner's heirs were unable to agree to either continue the business or to sell it. 
Id. at 570. The Court stated that, had one of the partners wrongfully repudiated the 
partnership and converted its assets, 
"the excluded partner . . . may waive the tort or breach and sue to specifically 
enforce the partnership or joint venture agreement, including the remedy of a 
judicial dissolution and an accounting . . . or the victim may submit to the 
repudiation and sue for damages for breach of the joint venture agreement." 
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Id. (quoting Jeaness v. Besnilian, 706 P.2d 143, 145-46 (Nev. 1985) (internal quotations 
omitted)).6 
Here, if the Reynses are at all correct that the Partnership dissolved prior to 1994, 
it could only have dissolved when Reyns transferred the Charlesworths' one-third interest 
in the Property to the Reyns Family Trust. At that time, arguably, the Property was no 
longer titled in the name of a partner, and therefore the transfer may have worked a 
dissolution. If so, the dissolution was wrongful because, as the trial court ruled and the 
Reynses do not appeal, the Property was in fact property of the Partnership. Transferring 
the Property to a third-party (here, the Reynses as trustees of their family trust) without 
the consent of the Charlesworths, is not permitted by the Partnership Agreement or by the 
Utah Uniform Partnership Act. Such a transfer would work a wrongful dissolution. 
Thus, under Wanlass, Reyns's transfer of the Charlesworths' interest in the Property gave 
the Charlesworths the option to sue to seek an accounting or to seek damages. As 
discussed below, although the Charlesworths' claims may have accrued as early as this 
time, the trial court was correct in ruling that the limitations period governing those 
claims was tolled until 1994.7 
6
 The Reynses are similarly incorrect in their citation of Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, 
993 P.2d 191, for the proposition that an accounting is the only remedy among co-
partners. (Appellees' Br. at 28 n.3 (citing Cheves, 1999 UT 86, U 34).) Appellees 
merely cite to the argument of counsel recited by the Court in Cheves, not to a holding 
of the Court. 
7
 Appellees make a policy argument to the effect that the Charlesworths accounting claim 
was not timely asserted because the Reynses disposed of Partnership books and records 
in 1996 (curiously, this was after the wrongful sale of the apartments to the third-party). 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION DO NOT BAR THE 
CHARLESWORTHS' CLAIMS 
The Reynses acknowledge that the shortest statute of limitation governing the 
Charlesworths' claims in this matter is three years. (Appellees' Br. at 24-25) The 
Charlesworths undisputedly filed this action within three years of the date Reyns 
informed them that the Partnership was "over" in the fall of 1994. The limitations 
periods were tolled until that time. Until then, the Charlesworths did not know, nor 
should they have known, nor did they have constructive or inquiry notice, of Reyns's 
wrongdoing. Because the Charlesworths filed their claims within three years of that date, 
their claims are not time barred. 
Generally, a cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of limitations begins 
to run on the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action. 
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996). However, in certain circumstances, 
the discovery rule operates to toll the limitations period until a party discovers the facts 
forming the basis of the cause of action. Id. 50-51. The discovery rule applies: (1) when 
This argument is unavailing for several reasons. First, as indicated above, an 
accounting is not necessary under the circumstances of this case. Second, the Reynses 
have failed to state what, if anything, they are unable to prove without these records. 
Third, the Reynses have not asserted any claims for offset or counterclaims in this 
action, and thus any such records are irrelevant. 
Appellees also claim that the Pelland decision supports their claim that the 
Charlesworths' time to seek an accounting was not tolled. (Appellees' Br. at 33-39.) 
Appellees ignore, however, that the Court in Pelland observed that the plaintiff was 
aware of the transfer of property when it occurred. Michael v. Pelland, No. 229876, 
2002 WL 31105082, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2002). A copy of the Pelland decision 
is submitted in the attached Addendum at Tab C. 
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mandated by statute; (2) when a defendant has concealed a plaintiffs cause of action; or 
(3) when exceptional circumstances exist. Any one of these three is sufficient to trigger 
application of the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations. Id. at 51. In this case, 
the second and third versions of the discovery rule mandate that the Charles worths' 
claims did not accrue until Reyns told them that the Partnership was "over." The 
Charlesworths filed the instant suit within three years of that time, which the Reynses 
concede is the shortest period of limitations that applies to the Charlesworths' claims. 
Thus, their claims are not barred by the statute of limitations. 
A. The Discovery Rule Tolled the Applicable Limitations Periods Because 
the Reynses Concealed the Charlesworths' Causes of Action 
The discovery rule applies when a defendant conceals a plaintiffs cause of action 
in order to prevent the defendant from profiting from such concealment. Id. at 52. For 
the discovery rule to apply on the ground that a defendant concealed the cause of action 
from the plaintiff, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of fraudulent 
concealment and demonstrate that a reasonable person would not have discovered the 
claim earlier. Id. at 51. This requires a determination of "(i) when a plaintiff would 
reasonably be on notice to inquire into a defendant's wrongdoing despite the defendant's 
efforts to conceal it; and (ii) whether a plaintiff, once on notice, would reasonably have, 
with due diligence, discovered the facts forming the basis of the cause of action despite 
the defendant' efforts to conceal those facts." Id. at 52. 
The facts of this case warrant application of the fraudulent concealment version of 
the discovery rule. The Reynses clearly attempted to conceal the facts giving rise to the 
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Charlesworths' claims herein. As previously stated in this memorandum, Reyns overtly 
treated the Charlesworths as partners until 1994. Prior to that time, Reyns had made 
partnership distributions to them, sent them K-ls reciting their partnership status and 
reflecting their share of Partnership distributions and losses, and Reyns's husband had 
sent letters to them explaining why the Partnership distributions had been small. During 
that time, however, and unbeknownst to the Charlesworths, Reyns had transferred the 
Charlesworths' share of the Property into her own family trust and had even obtained a 
quitclaim deed meant for Shirlie Charlesworth, of which Shirlie was unaware, and failed 
to deliver it to her. By failing to inform the Charlesworths of her actions, as was her 
fiduciary duty, and instead pretending as if the Partnership continued, Reyns, assisted by 
her husband, concealed her wrongdoing. 
Given the Reynses' concealment, a reasonable person would not have discovered 
the true state of affairs any earlier than the Charlesworths did. Importantly, the Reynses' 
efforts to conceal their wrongdoing occurred after Reyns clandestinely transferred the 
two-thirds interest in the Property to her family trust. Thus, the Charlesworths had no 
reason to suspect Reyns's transfer. The Reynses claim that the Charlesworths stopped 
receiving partnership distributions after 1985, and that this fact allegedly put the 
Charlesworths on inquiry notice of the Reynses' wrongdoing. As noted above, however, 
this statement flies in the face of the facts of this case. 
The Reynses also contend that the Charlesworths were put on inquiry notice when 
they purportedly demanded an accounting and were rebuffed. Contrary to the Reynses' 
assertions, however, the Charlesworths did not request an accounting, nor were they 
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rebuffed. Instead, in 1988, they made a simple inquiry as to why the cash distributions 
had ceased. Importantly, in response, the Reynses did not divulge that Reyns had 
transferred the Charlesworths' interest in the Property to her family trust three years 
earlier. Instead, Reyns's husband responded with a letter stating that the distributions 
were small in light of a number of factors, including significant maintenance costs, 
increased property taxes, and lower rents as a result of competition from federal low-
income housing being built in the area. The explanation seemed reasonable to the 
Charlesworths, as it would to anyone, and they did not inquire into the matter further. 
Again, such events did not put Plaintiffs on inquiry notice. 
The Reynses finally contend that the Charlesworths were on inquiry notice 
because the Schedule K-ls showed distributions to the Charlesworths that had not been 
made. On the contrary, the distributions were made into the Charlesworths' capital 
accounts, which were reflected in the K-ls themselves. Through adjustments in their 
capital accounts, the Charlesworths continued to share in the profits and losses of the 
Partnership while the Reynses secretly transferred the Charlesworths' share of the 
Property into their family trust. 
Based on these facts, no reasonable person would have suspected that a cause of 
action had accrued to them. The Charlesworths had even less reason to suspect 
wrongdoing because Reyns was a family member. Moreover, she had fiduciary duties to 
the Charlesworths, who were her fellow partners. They had a right to trust her continued 
representations that the Charlesworths were partners and her continued treatment of them 
as such. See, e.g., Given v. Cappas, 486 N.E.2d 583, 593 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (a 
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partner's fiduciary duty to disclose self-dealing "excus[es] his partners of any duty of 
diligence in discovering the true state of affairs"); First Bank & Trust of Idaho v. Jones, 
725 P.2d 186, 189 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (given the nature of a partner's fiduciary duty to 
other partners, "if an undisclosed breach [of that duty] exists the statute of limitations was 
tolled until the breach was unequivocally made known to [the non-breaching partner]"). 
In Weaver v. Watson, 474 N.E.2d 759 (111. Ct. App. 1984), the Illinois Court of 
Appeals decided a matter that bears similarity to the instant case. In Weaver, one of two 
partners in a partnership died in 1974. Mrs. Weaver, the wife of the deceased partner, 
eventually filed a complaint for an accounting against the surviving partner in 1981. In 
her suit, Mrs. Weaver alleged that she took over her husband's interest in the partnership 
after he died. Id. at 761-63. The surviving partner alleged that the statute of limitations 
began to run upon the death of Mrs. Weaver's husband in 1974, and thus the statute of 
limitations for an accounting had expired. Id. Mrs. Weaver argued that the statute did 
not begin to run until she discovered that the surviving partner had dropped her name 
from the partnership checking account. Id. The court noted that the result was no 
different under either scenario. Id. at 763. The court observed that the surviving partner 
was the dominant figure in the partnership. Id. Also, the surviving partner sent Mrs. 
Weaver checks marked "dividend," which the court believed amounted to a 
representation by the surviving partner that Mrs. Weaver had an interest in the 
partnership and that the interest would be recognized. Id. In light of those 
circumstances, the court held that "the statute of limitations was tolled until Mrs. Weaver 
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learned of [the surviving partner's] actions inconsistent with her claimed interest in the 
partnership business." Id. 
Because the Reynses concealed the facts giving rise to the Charlesworths' causes 
of action by, among other things, representing to them that they had a partnership 
interest, and because they did not know and had no reason to know of the facts giving rise 
to their claims, the fraudulent concealment version of the discovery rule operated to toll 
the statutes of limitation on their claims until Reyns told them that the Partnership was 
"over." Under the facts presented herein, no one would have had reason to suspect the 
Reynses' actions prior to that time. 
B. The Discovery Rule Applies in Light of Exceptional Circumstances 
The Court may also apply the discovery rule where exceptional circumstances 
would make application of the general rule as to the accrual of a limitations period 
irrational or unjust. The test to determine whether exceptional circumstances warrant 
application of the discovery rule is a balancing test. The test weighs the hardship 
imposed on the plaintiff by the application of the statute of limitations against any 
prejudice to the defendant from the passage of time. Snow v. Rudd, 998 P.2d 262, 266 
(Utah 2000); Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995). As the Utah 
Supreme Court noted in Rudd, "[i]n the category of cases involving beneficiaries' claims 
of trustee misconduct, we have, in effect, already conducted this balancing test." Rudd, 
998 P.2d at 266. In that context, to not apply the discovery rule would be unjust, 
particularly where familial relationships are involved. Id. "In such a situation, the 
38 
beneficiary will be less likely to question the motives of the trustee and less likely to 
sue." Id, Therefore, it is appropriate to apply the discovery rule in that setting. 
A partner has a duty to hold any profits derived from use of partnership property 
as a trustee for any other partners in the partnership. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-8; MandrelL 
892 S.W.2d at 845. This duty arises out of the fiduciary relationship that exists between 
partners, which requires a partner to act with the highest standard of integrity and good 
faith. Giambrone, 471 N.E.2d at 808. Because the duty of a partner to other partners in 
the partnership is the same as that of a trustee to a beneficiary, the Rudd decision suggests 
that a breach of that duty is an exceptional circumstance sufficient to trigger application 
of the discovery rule. That is particularly so where the parties at issue are family 
members. 
The Reynses should not be allowed to keep the fruits of their wrongdoing under 
the circumstances of this case. To allow them to keep their ill-gotten gain would create 
poor public policy and encourage fraud. Given the Reynses' relationship to the 
Charles worths, the Reynses' efforts to conceal their wrongdoing, and the Charles worths' 
ignorance of the Reynses' actions, the Charlesworths did not know of, nor did they have 
reason to suspect, the Reynses' wrongdoing until Reyns finally disclosed that she 
Q 
believed the Partnership was "over." 
8
 In Rudd, the Court determined that, notwithstanding application of the discovery rule as 
a result of exceptional circumstances, plaintiffs claims were barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations because she had reason to know of facts giving rise to her claim 
more than four years (the applicable limitations period) before she filed suit. Unlike this 
case, the plaintiff in Rudd was confused about the nature of the trust, and she was also 
aware that the property in which she claimed an interest was sold out of the trust. 998 
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In light of the above showing, the discovery rule applied to the Charles worths' 
claims. Thus, they must only have filed this action within the applicable limitations 
period from the time they knew or should have known of the facts giving rise to their 
causes of action. Because the Charlesworths did not know or have reason to know of the 
Reynses' defalcations until Reyns told them the Partnership was "over," and they filed 
their claims within the shortest of the applicable limitations periods from that time, their 
claims are not time-barred.9 
C. The Charlesworths Did Not Have Constructive Notice of the Reynses' 
Actions by Virtue of Their Recording the Deeds Transferring the 
Property with the County Recorder 
The Reynses argue that the Charlesworths are charged with constructive notice of 
the Reynses' actions with respect to the Property because Reyns's transfer of the Property 
to her family trust was the subject of a deed recorded with the Weber County Recorder. 
The Reynses posit that recording a deed provides notice to all persons of the contents of 
the deed. In making this assertion, the Reynses appear to suggest that the Charlesworths 
P.2d at 266-67. Here, none of the Charlesworths, or Shirlie Charlesworth, were ever 
given copies of the governing documents. Plaintiff Rennly Charlesworth may have 
received an unsigned copy of the Partnership agreement, but it was virtually illegible and 
he did not and could not review its terms. Also, there was no confusion about the 
Partnership in their minds—Reyns's performance seemed steady and sensible. Finally, 
unlike the plaintiff in Rudd, they were completely unaware that Reyns had transferred 
their portion of the Property to her family trust. 
9
 The Charlesworths believe that the record before the Court warrants denial of the 
Reynses' cross motion as a matter of law. To the extent that the Court believes there is 
conflicting evidence as to when the facts giving rise to the Charlesworths' claims were or 
should have been discovered, the Court should similarly not enter judgment in the 
Reynses' favor and allow the jury to decide such issues. Berenda, 914 P.2d at 53-54, 902 
P.2d at 634. 
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had a duty to periodically search the records of the Weber County Recorder to check up 
on their aunt, who was not only a family member, but also owed fiduciary duties to them. 
Not only is this result in itself impractical, but it is contrary to the requirements of Utah 
law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clarified that recording statutes "'are intended to 
protect those having subsequent dealings with the property'" and "'impute[] notice only 
to those who are bound to search for it.'" Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., 
970 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Utah 1998) (quoting Romero v. Sanchez, 492 P.2d 140, 144 (N.M. 
1971)). The constructive notice afforded by the recording statute is not notice to the 
public at large. It is the transferee of the property that is bound to search for 
encumbrances thereof and who is deemed to have constructive knowledge of such 
encumbrances. The very case cited by the Reynses, Johnson v. Higley, 989 P.2d 61 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999), makes this point. See id. at 70 ("The recording statute's purpose is 
to provide a method by which a transferee can protect himself from intervening 
claimants." (quotation omitted)); see also First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 
P.2d 834, 839 (Utah 1998) ("The salutariness of the recording statute is that it provides 
stability and certainty to land titles on which purchasers must rely."). Indeed, as the 
Romero court observed in rejecting the notion advanced by the Reynses, the recording 
statutes cannot be construed to give notice to the world at large. 492 P.2d at 143-44. 
Otherwise, such statutes would serve as an automatic shelter for fraud. Id. 
The Charleworths were not a transferee of the Property - Reyns's family trust was 
the transferee. Moreover, the Reynses do not, and cannot, cite to any authority creating a 
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duty in the Charlesworths to search for the instrument Reyns used to transfer the Property 
to her family trust under the circumstances of this case. As a practical matter, it stretches 
credulity to suggest that the Charlesworths should have visited the county recorder's 
office as a matter of course every few months to inquire as to the status of the Property. 
It stretches credulity even further when the Charlesworths were not only dealing with a 
fellow partner who owes them the highest level of fiduciary duty, but their own aunt. 
The fact that Reyns recorded the instrument transferring the Property to her family trust 
cannot be held to have imparted constructive notice of her activities to the Charlesworths. 
See Rappleye v. Rappleye, 2004 UT App. 290,1fi[ 32-33, 507 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 
(concealment prong of discovery rule applies to toll statute of limitations regardless of 
inquiry or constructive notice). 
D, The Reynses' Cases Are Inapposite 
The Reynses rely on four cases to argue that the discovery rule does not apply in 
this case. However, each is distinguishable from the instant facts. First, in Anderson v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the plaintiff was aware 
that the primary asset of the trust in which she was the beneficiary (consisting of over $1 
million in stock in Levi Strauss) was completely lost, while the unemployed trustee (her 
son) bought a $500,000 home and Mercedes and BMW automobiles. Id. at 576-77, 579. 
The trust was her nest egg, and she believed that the funds in the trust were 
"untouchable." Id. at 579. Under these circumstances, the Court held that the plaintiff 
was on inquiry notice, which precluded application of the discovery rule. Accordingly, 
the Court upheld dismissal of her claim. Id. at 580. In this action, the plaintiffs timely 
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filed suit after they were told the partnership was over in 1994 and once they discovered 
that Reyns sold their interest in the Property. Until that time, it is undisputed that they 
were unaware that the primary asset of the Partnership had been liquidated. 
Second, in Nilson-Newey & Co. v. Utah Resources International, 905 P.2d 312 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995), the Court affirmed the dismissal of a case based on laches and the 
statute of limitations where a member of a syndicate was not provided an accounting for 
thirty-five years, where he had not received any distributions for twenty years, and where 
he had never been provided with form 10-Ks. Id. at 313, 317. In addition to delaying to 
seek an accounting for decades, the Court found that the defendant would be prejudiced if 
the matter went forward because, among other things, the syndicate engaged in 
"numerous, complex transactions with numerous, unrelated individuals and entities 
involving millions of dollars over a period of thirty-five years" and many of the 
documents and witnesses concerning the transaction are unavailable. Id. at 316, 317. 
The instant case presents an opposite set of facts. As demonstrated above, the 
Charlesworths received distributions until 1994, the year in which they did not receive a 
Schedule K-l, after receiving them regularly for years and years. Moreover, in contrast 
to the syndicate in Nilson-Newey, the Partnership was very simple, and comprised of one 
asset. Moreover, throught the Schedule K-ls, the Partnership accounts were settled each 
year. Thus, Nilson-Newey is inapposite. 
Third, the Reynses cite Leggroan v. Zion 's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 232 P.2d 
746 (Utah 1951). Again, this case does not support their position. In Leggroan, a trust 
terminated and was liquidated over a period often years. Over time, the distributions 
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became smaller and less frequent. Id. at 750. Importantly, the Utah Supreme Court 
observed that "each successive payment would halt the running of the reasonable time 
period" for the beneficiaries to realize that the last distribution had been made and for the 
limitations period to run and laches begin to accrue. Id. The Court ultimately held that to 
have waited three or four years after the last known payment was unreasonable. Id. 
Moreover, the defendant had been prejudiced by the passage of time in that documents 
and witnesses were unavailable, which precluded obtaining a reliable set of facts. Id. 
Once again, the instant facts distinguish this case. Here, although the payments became 
smaller, distributions were made each and every year until Reyns said, in response to an 
inquiry from the Charlesworths, that the Partnership was over. Moreover, unlike in 
Leggroan, the Partnership had not terminated. Further, there is no prejudice to the 
Reynses. All of the documents and witnesses necessary are available. The basic contract 
documents were submitted of record, as were the documents effecting the transfers of 
property. The Reynses have failed to show that any missing documents are necessary to 
the disposition of this action. Accordingly, the Reynses reliance on Leggroan is 
misplaced. 
Finally, the Reynses rely on Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993) That 
case is also distinguishable from the facts of record in this matter. In Baldwin, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that a judgment creditor's claim was time barred. Id. at 1197. The 
Court observed that after obtaining a judgment lien, the judgment creditor should have 
searched for the property at issue. Id. Obviously, there was no judgment against the 
Reynses until this year. Thus, the rule in Baldwin does not apply. 
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Not only do the cases cited by the Reynses fail to support their position, but they 
in fact highlight the applicability and propriety of the discovery rule in this case. Until 
Reyns told them the Partnership was "over," the Charlesworths had no suspicion, nor 
reason to be suspicious, nor any actual knowledge of Reyns's actions. In light of their 
continued annual distributions, and the Reynses' explanations, the Charlesworths acted 
reasonably. Moreover, there is no prejudice to the Reynses because of the elementary 
nature of the Partnership, the fact that it had a sole asset, the fact that its accounts were 
settled each year, and the fact that the relevant documents are of record. Accordingly, the 
Court should affirm the trial court's decision that the discovery rule tolled the applicable 
statutes of limitation until 2004. 
E. In Any Event, Reyns Extended the Statutory Period for the 
Charlesworths' Breach of Contract Claim by Reaffirming Her 
Obligations to Them 
The Utah Code expressly provides that "[i]n any case founded on contract," the 
limitations period begins to run anew when the defendant, or defendant's agent, pays a 
portion of principal or interest due; acknowledges an existing liability, debt, or claim; or 
promises to pay such liability, claim, or debt, if such acknowledgement or promise is 
made in writing signed by the party to be charged. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44; Butcher 
v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311,313 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Apart from their arguments 
concerning an accounting and the statutes of limitation, the Reynses have not contested 
that they owed a contractual duty to the Charlesworths by virtue of the Partnership 
Agreement. Reyns breached this duty by failing to pay Plaintiffs their portion of the 
proceeds from the sale of the Property. Until 1993, Reyns or her agent annually sent the 
45 
Charlesworths Schedule K-ls in which she reaffirmed that they were partners in the 
Partnership, and paid distributions to or deducted losses from their capital accounts. 
Through this annual acknowledgement of the Charlesworths' interest in the 
Partnership, she reaffirmed her obligations to them. Thus, under this statute, the 
Charlesworths are only required to have filed their claim within the limitations period 
from the latest date on which Reyns acknowledged their interest and/or made payments 
to them. Accordingly, the limitations period on the Charlesworths' breach of contract 
claim began to run no earlier than 1993, which was the last time Reyns acknowledged 
their interest and made a distribution to them. It is undisputed that the Charlesworths 
filed their claim within six years of that date - the limitations period governing breach of 
written contract claims. Therefore, regardless of the disposition of the Charlesworths' 
other claims in this action, the Court should affirm the trial court's decision on the 
Charlesworths' breach of contract claim. 
IV. THE REYNSES DO NOT PROPERLY CONTEST THE JUDGMENT 
AMOUNT 
The Reynses suggest in their opening brief that the Judgment entered by the trial 
court failed to give them credit for alleged closing costs paid on the sale of the 
apartments. (Appellees' Br. at 21-22, 31.) However, the Reynses have not properly 
raised this issue for at least three independent reasons. As a result, the Court should 
disregard the Reynses' assertion in this regard. 
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A. The Amount the Reynses Received from the Sale of the Apartments, 
Which Formed the Basis of the Judgment Amount, Was Admitted 
Below 
First, the Reynses failed to contest the amount of consideration that the 
Charlesworths maintained was received by the Reyns Family Trust and Ellen Isom as a 
result of the sale, which amount was used as the basis of the Judgment amount. In the 
statement of fact supporting the Charlesworths' motion for summary judgment, the 
Charlesworths alleged that, of the $350,000 paid by the purchasers of the property, the 
Reyns Family Trust received two-thirds of this amount and Ellen Isom's heirs received 
one-third of this amount. (R. at 197, 273, 280-81, 325.) The Reyns's failed to contest 
this statement of fact. {Id. at 339, 343, 372.) As a result, it is deemed admitted, and 
cannot now be challenged. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Utah Code of Judicial 
Admin. R. 4-501(2)(B), repealed November 1, 2003 (effective at the time of the trial 
court's order granting summary judgment and providing that "[a]ll material facts set forth 
in the movant's statement and properly supported by accurate reference to the record 
shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's statement."); Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., 
Inc., 2004 UT App , ffl[ 13-15, WL 2248195 (applying Utah Code of Judicial Admin. 
R. 4-501(2)(B) where rule was in effect at time summary judgment papers were filed).10 
A copy of the Porter decision is submitted in the attached Addendum at Tab D. 
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B. The Reynses Failed to Take Issue with the Judgment Amount Below, 
and Therefore Waived Any Argument in This Regard 
Second, the Reynses did not raise this issue in response to the Charles worths' 
motion to dismiss certain claims and parties and to enter judgment. Along with the 
Charles worths' motion papers, they served on the Reynses a proposed form of judgment, 
which of course specifically set forth the principal amount to which the Charlesworths 
believed they were entitled. (R. at 573.) Despite having a full opportunity to contest the 
principal amount of the proposed Judgment, the Reynses did not raise this issue. In fact, 
they did not respond at all. Accordingly, over one month after the Charlesworths 
submitted their motion to dismiss certain claims and parties and to enter judgment, as 
well as their proposed form of judgment, the trial court entered the same. {Id. at 572-75.) 
Because the Reynses failed to raise this issue below, they have waived it for purposes of 
appeal. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, % 13, 61 P.3d 1062; Brookside Mobile Home 
Parkt Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, \ 14, 48 P.3d 968. 
C. The Reynses Have Failed to Identify the Judgment Amount as an Issue 
Before this Court 
Finally, the Reynses have not identified an alleged error in the judgment amount 
as an issue for this appeal. (Appellants' Br. at 1-2.) Instead, the Reynses appear to 
merely use the alleged error in the Judgment as an illustration to support their claim that 
an accounting is a prerequisite for any and all intra-partnership actions, regardless of the 
circumstances of such actions. {See id. at 31.) As demonstrated above, however, there is 
no need for an accounting in this action as a matter of law. The rules of this Court 
require an Appellant to identify all issues presented for review, and to denominate them 
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as such in a specific place in the brief. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). Given that the Reynses 
merely use this issue for illustrative purposes, and have failed to identify it as being 
presented for review, they have waived review of this issue. 
For each of these independent reasons, the Court should not undertake review of 
the amount of the Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Reynses in essence acknowledge their misdeeds, and acknowledge that they 
are possessed of ill-gotten financial benefit. They simply claim that they may keep the 
fruits of their efforts because the Charlesworths failed to jump through a purported 
accounting hoop and because the Charlesworths' allegedly acted too late to redress the 
Reynses admitted actions, notwithstanding that they acted to conceal those very actions 
from the Charlesworths. The law should not countenance such a result. In light of the 
above undisputed facts and authorities, it does not. An accounting is not a prerequisite to 
this action. Moreover, the applicable statutes of limitation were tolled until 1994. Thus, 
the Charlesworths' claims at issue, filed in June 1997, were timely. Accordingly, the 
Court should affirm the trial court's order and judgment. 
DATED this day of November, 2004. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Arthur B. Berger 
Carolynn Clark 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
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The following statutes determinative of this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-4 
In determining whether a partnership exists these rules shall apply: 
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie 
evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such 
profits were received in payment: 
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise 
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord. 
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner. 
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts of payment vary with the 
profits of the business. 
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good will of a business or 
other property by installments or otherwise. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-5 
All property originally brought into the partnership stock, or subsequently 
acquired by purchase or otherwise on account of the partnership, is partnership property. 
Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired with partnership funds in 
partnership property. 
Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership name. Title so 
acquired can be conveyed only in the partnership name. 
A conveyance to a partnership in the partnership name, though without words of 
inheritance, passes the entire estate of the grantor, unless a contrary intent appears. 
Utah Code Ann. $ 48-1-7 
Where title to real property is in the name of one or more but not all of the 
partners, and the record does not disclose the right of the partnership, the partners in 
whose name the title stands may convey title to such property, but the partnership may 
recover such property, if the partners' act does not bind the partnership under the 
provisions of Section 48-1-6(1), unless the purchaser or his assignee is a holder for value 
without knowledge. 
Where the title to real property is in the name of one or more or all of the partners, 
or in a third person in trust for the partnership, a conveyance executed by a partner in the 
partnership name, or in his own name, passes the equitable interest of the partnership, 
provided the act is one within the authority of the partner under the provisions of Section 
48-1-(6)1. 
Where the title to real property is in the names of all the partners a conveyance 
executed by all the partners passes all their rights in such property. 
Utah Code Ann, $ 48-1-18 
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee 
for it any profits, derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any 
transaction connected with the formation, conduct or liquidation of the partnership or 
from any use by him of its property. 
This section applies also to the representatives of a deceased partner engaged in 
the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership as the personal representatives of the last 
surviving partner. 
Utah Code Ann. 8 48-1-24 
A conveyance by a partner of his interest in the partnership does not of itself 
dissolve the partnership, or, as against the other partners in the absence of agreement, 
entitle the assignee during the continuance of the partnership to interfere in the 
management or administration of the partnership business or affairs, or to require any 
information or account of partnership transactions, or to inspect the partnership books; 
but it merely entitled the assignee to receive in accordance with his contract the profits to 
which the assigning partner would otherwise be entitled 
In case of a dissolution of partnership, the assignee is entitled to receive his 
assignor's interest, and may require an account from the date only of the last account 
agreed to by all the partners. 
Utah Code Ann. S 48-1-27 
On dissolution a partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up 
of partnership affairs is completed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-34 
Unless otherwise agreed, the partners who have not wrongfully dissolved the 
partnership or the legal representatives of the last surviving partner, not bankrupt, has the 
right to wind up the partnership affairs; provided, however, that any partner, his legal 
representatives or his assignee upon cause shown may obtain a winding up by the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-39 
When any partner retires or dies and the business is continued under any of the 
conditions set forth in Section 48-l-38(l),(2),(3),(5),(6), or Section 48-l-35(2)(b) without 
any settlement of accounts as between him or his estate and the person or partnership 
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continuing the business, unless otherwise agreed, he or his legal representatives as against 
such persons or partnership may have the value of his interest at the date of dissolution 
ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal to the value of his 
interest in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, at his option or at the option of his 
legal representatives, in lieu of interest, at the profits attributable to the use of his right in 
the property of the dissolved partnership; provided, that the creditors of the dissolved 
partnership as against the separate creditors or the 'representative of the retired or 
deceased partner shall have priority on any claim arising under this section, as provided 
by Section 48-1-38(8). 
Utah Code Ann, § 48-1-40 
The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner or his legal 
representative as against the winding-up partners or the surviving partners or the person 
or partnership continuing the business, at the date of dissolution in the absence of any 
agreement to the contrary. 
Utah Code Ann, § 78-12-23 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in 
writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
Utah Code Ann, 8 78-12-25 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
Utah Code Ann, 8 78-12-44 
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or interest shall 
have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any 
promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an action may be brought within the 
period prescribed for the same after such payment, acknowledgment or promise; but such 
acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged 
thereby. When a right of action is barred by the provisions of any statute, it shall be 
unavailable either as a cause of action or ground of defense. 
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TabB 
The Parties' Statements of Fact 
Submitted in Their Summary Judgment Briefing to the Trial Court1 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
(The Parties) 
1. Shirlie J. Charlesworth was the 
trustee under the Trust Agreement, 
dated March 22, 1963. (Answer to 
Am. Compl. HI.) 
2. The beneficiaries under the 
Trust Agreement were Plaintiffs Jack 
G. Charlesworth, Rennly J. 
Charlesworth, Jace Martinson, 
GayLee C. McEwan, and Mirid 
Weidner. (IcL1J2.) 
3. The Partnership, Ruell 
Investment Co., is a Utah general 
partnership doing business within the 
State of Utah. (Am. Compl. U 3; 
Answer to Am. Compl. f 3.) 
4. Reyns is a general partner and 
managing partner of the Partnership. 
(Am. Compl. ^ 4; Answer to Am. 
Compl. K 3.) 
5. Isom was a general partner of 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 






Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Replj 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
1
 All references to exhibits in this chart are to the exhibits submitted in connection with the parties' summary judgment briefing. These exhibits are part of the record on appeal. 
I!harlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
he Partnership, and passed away in 
[988. Her interest was succeeded to 
)y Defendants Raymond Isom, Patrick 
som, and Colleen Ruth Isom Findley. 
Am. Compl. ffi| 5-7; Answer to Am. 
bompl.K3.) 
5. Reyns is also a joint trustee 
ander the Trust Agreement dated 
August 27, 1985 (the "Reyns Family 
Trust"). Her husband, Defendant Arie 
William Reyns, and their son, 
Defendant Alan W. Reyns, also serve 
as joint trustees of the Reyns Family 
Trust. The Reyns Family Trust 
resides in Utah because it is 
administered here. (Am. Compl. ffl[ 8-
9; Answer to Am. Compl. ^ 3.) 
(The Contract) 
7. On March 22, 1963, Reyns and 
Isom entered into the Contract for the 
purchase of the Property from Mr. and 
Mrs. Charlesworth for $100,000. 
(Am. Compl. f 10; Answer to Am. 
Compl. H 3.) A true and correct copy 
of the Contract is filed herewith as 
Exhibit 1. (Defs.' Response to Pis.' 
First Req. for Admis. No. 11, filed 
herewith as Exhibit 2.) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Undisputed. 
Undisputed. 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
Reynses9 Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
? 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
8. Under the Contract, Reyns 
owned, and owed the obligations 
relating to, two-thirds of the Contract, 
while Isom owned and was obligated 
upon one-third of the Contract. The 
Contract required installment 
payments of $500 per month. 
(Contract (Ex. 1) 1fl[ 2, 3; Answer to 
Am. Compl. U 4.) 
9. Possession of the Property and 
rents therefrom were assigned to 
Reyns and Isom as of April 1, 1963. 
(Contract (Ex. 1)1J4.) 
10. Reyns was permitted under the 
Contract to convey one-half of her 
interest in the Contract to Shirhe 
Charlesworth, m trust, for the use and 
benefit of her children—the Plaintiffs 
and moving parties as identified 
above. (IdL1[12.) 
(The Partnership Agreement) 
11. On March 22, 1963, the same 
date the Contract was executed, Reyns 
and Isom entered into the Partnership 
Agreement establishing the 
Partnership. (Am. Compl. H 13; 
Answer to Am. Compl. ^ 3.) A true 
and correct copy of the Partnership 
Agreement is filed herewith as Exhibit 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 





Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
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Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
3. (Defs.' Response to Pis.' First Req. 
for Admis. (Ex. 2) No. 13.) 
12. Reyns was designated the 
managing partner, and was required to 
operate and manage the property, 
collect rents from tenants, keep 
financial records, not commingle 
partnership funds with any other 
funds, and at least annually disburse 
profits in excess of the obligations of 
the Partnership (including its payment 
obligations under the Contract), to the 
partners according to their respective 
interests in the Partnership. 
(Partnership Agreement (Ex. 3) ffll 4, 
5,7; Compl J^ 15; Answer to Am. 
Compl. |^ 3.) Reyns was given the 
discretion to determine the portion of 
profits to be distributed and the 
portion to be retained by the 
Partnership. (Partnership Agreement 
(Ex. 3) H 7.) 
13. As their initial capital 
contributions to the Partnership, Reyns 
and Isom each assigned their 
respective interests in the Contract to 
the Partnership. (Answer to Am. 
Compl. H 5.) The Contract, and the 
Property purchased thereunder, were 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Undisputed. 
Undisputed. 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply | 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
A 
1 Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
1 and remained the principal assets of 
the Partnership. 
1 14. The Partnership Agreement 
expressly noted that Reyns intended to 
transfer one-half of her interest in the 
Contract (i.e., a one-third interest in 
the entire Contract) to Shirlie 
Charlesworth in trust for her children. 
(Partnership Agreement (Ex. 3) U 6.) 
Reyns and Isom expressly consented 
to such transfer, "provided the said 
Trustee takes the same subject to this 
Partnership Agreement." (Id.) 
Importantly, the Partnership 
Agreement further provided that 
"[a]fter said transfer, the Trustee shall 
own one-third, and each party hereto 
[Reyns and Isom] shall own one-third 
of the contract." (Id) 
| (The Trust Agreement) 
15. Contemporaneous with the 
execution of the Contract and the 
Partnership Agreement, Reyns 
assigned one-half of her two-thirds 
interest in the Contract (i.e., a one-
j third interest in the entire Contract) to 
Shirlie Charlesworth, as trustee for her 
children. (Trust Agreement 1J 1, a true 
and correct copy of which is filed 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Undisputed. 
Undisputed. 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Repl; 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
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Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
herewith as Exhibit 4 (Dels.' 
Response to Pis.' First Req. for 
Admis. (Ex. 2) No. 12).) 
16. The Trust Agreement provided 
that Shirhe Charlesworth (as trustee), 
Reyns, and Isom "each own an 
undivided one-third interest in [the 
CJontract." (Trust Agreement (Ex. 4) 
ID 
17. The Trust Agreement further 
specified that the "trustee by accepting 
this trust and the duties and rights of 
trustee thereby becomes a partner m 
[the Partnership." (Id U 2.) 
18. Thus, as a result of Reyns' 
assignment, Shirhe Charlesworth, as 
trustee, held a one-third interest m the 
Contract and also became an equal 
one-third partner in the Partnership. 
a m i.2.) 
19. The trust was to terminate by its 
own terms upon the happening of 
certain contingencies, including the 
satisfaction of the payment obligations 
under the Contract and/or when the 
beneficiaries attained their majority, 
i (Id H 6.) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 





Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
f* 
1 Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
I 20. Regardless of how the Trust was 
to terminate, the end result was that 
the beneficiaries or the heirs of any 
non-surviving beneficiaries were to 
own, among other things, their 
respective portions of the trust 
principal. (Id.) 
1 21. As it turned out, the payment 
obligation under the Contract was not 
satisfied until after all of the 
beneficiaries turned 21. (See Shirlie 
Charlesworth Dep. at 5:22 to 6:5, a 
true and correct copy of which is filed 
herewith as Exhibit 5; Am. Compl. U 
22; Answer to Am. Compl. |^ 3.) In 
that instance, "all allocated income 
and all of the interest in the trust 
principal shall be or have been 
distributed to the beneficiaries free 
and clear of the trust." (Trust 
Agreement (Ex. 4) ^ 6.) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Undisputed. 
1. Paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs 
statement of undisputed facts is a 
correct statement that once the 
payment obligation under the contract 
was satisfied, and the Plaintiffs had 
attained the age of majority, the trust 
was to be dissolved and the trust 
corpus distributed outright to the 
beneficiaries of the trust. However, 
Plaintiff Shirlie J. Charlesworth, the 
Trustee of the trust, took no action to 
see that the trust provisions were 
carried out, that any property or 
partnership interests were conveyed to 
her children, the beneficiaries of the 
trust, or even that trust records were 
maintained. Plaintiff Shirlie J. 
Charlesworth, as Trustee of the trust, 
took no action whatsoever to 
safeguard the interests of her children 
under the trust. Deposition of Shirlie 
Charlesworth, 17:1-3, 17:25-18:2. 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
1. In paragraph 1 of their 
statement of fact, Defendants agree 
with paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs' 
statement of fact, but allege that 
Shirlie Charlesworth took no action to 
safeguard the interests of her children 
under the trust, including ensuring that 
the trust provisions were carried out 
and that property or partnership 
interests were conveyed to Plaintiffs. 
Defendants further allege that 
Plaintiffs failed to take action to 
become partners in their own right. 
These purported facts 
mischaracterize the record. 
Defendants ignore the fact that the 
trust terminated, by its own terms, with 
respect to each of the Plaintiffs as they 
respectively attained their majority, 
and that the former trust beneficiaries 
would directly own their respective 
portions of the trust principal, namely 
Reynses9 Statement of Fact in Replj 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
Undisputed. 
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Charlesworths5 Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Additionally, as Plaintiffs' point out, 
the trust was to terminate in 1982 
when the contract was paid. Under 
Plaintiffs' theory, they should have 
become partners in their own 
individual right in 1982. Instead, 
Plaintiffs took no action, and, as 
hereinafter explained, the partnership 
dissolved in 1982. 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (R. at 483-84) 
(R. at 372-82) 
a one-third share of the Contract and 
the Partnership. (Pis.'Statement of 
Fact ffl[ 19-20 (Defendants do not 
dispute this point).) For example, the 
trust agreement, of which Reyns 
herself was the Settlor, specifically 
stated that all "'income and all of the 
interest in the trust principal'" were to 
be made to the Plaintiffs "'free and 
clear of the trust'" once the Plaintiffs 
had attained their majority. (Id |^ 21 
(quoting Trust Agreement) 
(Defendants do not dispute this 
point).) There is nothing whatsoever 
in the record to suggest that Plaintiffs 
were required to take any action to 
become partners. Reyns herself 
recognized this fact by making 
distributions directly to the Plaintiffs 
once they had attained their majority 
and by expressly reciting that 
Plaintiffs were partners in the 
Schedule K-ls she sent them. (Id. ffl[ 
34, 35 (Defendants do not dispute this 
point).) Moreover, by the time the 
contract was paid off, the trust 
agreement had already terminated 
because all of the Plaintiffs had 
attained their majority by several 
years, and owned their partnership 
interests outright. (Id tH 19-21 | 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in Reynses' Statement of Fact in Replj 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (R. at 483-84) 
(R. at 372-82) 
(Defendants do not dispute these 
points).) Thus, Shirlie Charlesworth's 
duty to protect the Plaintiffs' interest 
in the trust had extinguished. 
Arguably, the only duty of 
Shirlie Charlesworth that may have 
continued after the Plaintiffs reached 
their majority was in connection with 
the Quitclaim Deed from Reyns to 
Shirlie Charlesworth, which was to be 
delivered to Shirlie and recorded when 
the contract for purchase of the 
Property was paid. (Id, ^ 24 
(Defendants do not dispute this 
point).) However, Shirlie testified in 
her deposition that the entire 
arrangement concerning the 
Partnership, the Contract, and the 
Trust Agreement had been set up by 
Ben Charlesworth and his lawyer, and 
that she did not participate in the 
arrangements. Mr. Charlesworth 
presented Shirlie with the Trust 
Agreement in his lawyer's office, and 
explained to her that the arrangement 
was for his grandchildren (the 
Plaintiffs), to help with college. He 
further explained that Plaintiffs would 
have a one-third ownership interest in 
the Contract and the Partnership, and 
would own one-third of the 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
(Additional Evidence Supporting 
Plaintiffs' Interest in the 
Partnership) 
22. The Contract required several 
documents to be placed in escrow at 
Commercial Security Bank in Ogden, 
Utah, including the following: a copy 
of the Contract; an escrow agreement 
executed contemporaneously with the 
Contract; and a Warranty Deed to the 
Property, conveying the Property from 
Mr. and Mrs. Charlesworth to Reyns 
and Isom, which Warranty Deed was 
to be delivered to Reyns and Isom 
upon completion of the payments 
required under the Contract. (Contract 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Undisputed. 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
apartments. He then asked Shirlie to 
sign the Trust Agreement, and she 
gratefully did. Mr. Charlesworth did 
not show her any other documents 
related to the transaction, such as the 
Partnership Agreement or the 
Quitclaim Deed. Specifically, Shirlie 
Charlesworth was never aware of the 
existence of the Quitclaim Deed until 
around the time this suit was filed. 
(See Shirlie Charlesworth Dep. at 
7:13-25, 9:4-10:25, 12:2-13:9, 18:3-7, 
18:16-19:16, a true and correct copy 
of which is filed herewith as Exhibit 
16.) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
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Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
(Ex. I)1ffl8, 11; Am.Compl.K12; 
Answer to Am. Compl. H 3.) 
1 23. The Contract further provided 
that in the event Reyns conveyed one-
half of her interest in the Contract to 
Shirlie Charlesworth, as trustee, prior 
to the delivery of the documents in 
escrow to Reyns and Isom - which 
Reyns did - "the trust deed from . . . 
Reyns to Shirlee [sic] Charlesworth 
shall also be deposited in escrow and 
held by the escrow agent until the total 
purchase price has been paid in full." 
(Contract (Ex. 1)1(12.) 
24. The Trust Agreement echoed 
and clarified the Contract's dictate. 
The Trust Agreement provided: "To 
further carry out this assignment the 
Settlor [Reyns] has executed her Quit 
Claim Deed to an undivided one-third 
of the trust property in favor of 
Trustee [Shirlie Charlesworth], which 
deed shall be deposited in escrow with 
the escrow holder named in the 
contract assigned and held by it until 
the contract principal is paid in full, at 
which time it will be delivered by the 
escrow holder to the Trustee and by 
her recorded." (Trust Agreement (Ex. 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Undisputed. 
2. Paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs 
statement of facts correctly states the 
terms of the trust agreement which 
provided that the Trustee, Plaintiff 
Shirlie Charlesworth, was under an 
obligation to deliver the trust assets to 
the beneficiaries upon the dissolution 
of the trust. The escrow instructions, 
Exhibit 6 to Plaintiffs motion,' 
specifically provide that the Quit 
Claim Deed from Ruth C. Reyns to 
Shirlie Charlesworth was to be 
delivered by the escrow agent to 
Shirlie Charlesworth. Again, Shirlie 
Charlesworth took no action to see 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
2. In paragraph 2 of their 
statement of fact, Defendants agree 
with paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs' 
statement of fact, but mischaracterize 
Shirlie Charlesworth's purported 
duties. See Plaintiffs' response to 
paragraph 1 above. 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
Undisputed. 
11 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
4)110.) 
25. A true and correct copy of the 
Escrow Agreement is filed herewith as 
Exhibit 6. (Defs.'Response to Pis.' 
First Req. for Admis. (Ex. 2) Nos. 3-
5.) 
26. As prescribed in the Contract 
and the Trust Agreement, the Escrow 
Agreement provided that, among other 
things, the Warranty Deed conveying 
the Property from Mr. and Mrs. 
Charlesworth to Reyns and Isom shall 
be delivered to Reyns and Isom when 
the Contract purchase price was paid 
in full. (Escrow Agreement (Ex. 6) at 
1.) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
that the provisions of the trust were 
carried out, that the interests of the 
beneficiaries were protected or to 
ascertain whether the escrow agent did 
its duty. See response to statement of 
facts U 21, above. 
Undisputed. 
Undisputed. 
Charlesworths9 Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
• 
1 0 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
27. Also as prescribed m the 
Contract and the Trust Agreement, the 
Escrow Agreement further provided 
that at the same time the Warranty 
Deed was delivered to Reyns and 
Isom, "the Quit Claim Deed from 
Ruth C. Reyns to Shirlee [sic] 
Charlesworth . . shall be delivered to 
the Grantee therein," namely Shirhe 
Charlesworth. fid.) 
28. Filed herewith as Exhibit 7 is a 
true and correct copy of the Quit 
Claim Deed, dated March 29, 1963, 
from Reyns to Shirhe Charlesworth, 
which bears Reyns's signature. 
(Defs.' Response to Pis.' First Req. for 
Admis. (Ex. 2) Nos. 1-2.) 
29. In the Quit Claim Deed, Reyns 
grants an undivided one-third interest 
in the Property such that, after 
recordation of the Quit Claim Deed, 
the Property will be owned "an 
undivided one-third by RUTH C. 
REYNS, an undivided one-third by 
ELLEN C. ISOM, an undivided one-
third by SHIRLEE [sic] 
CHARLESWORTH, TRUSTEE, as 
tenants in common." (Quit Claim 
Deed (Ex. 7) at 1.) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 




Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
13 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
30. On or about October 6, 1983, 
when the purchase price was paid in 
full, the Warranty Deed, filed herewith 
as Exhibit 8, was delivered to Reyns. 
(Am. Compl. ^ 22; Answer to Am. 
Comply 3.) 
31. Although the Escrow Agreement 
directs that the Quit Claim Deed be 
delivered to Shirlie Charlesworth, 
(Escrow Agreement (Ex. 6) at 1), it 
appears that the Quit Claim Deed was 
actually delivered to Reyns. 
32. Filed herewith as Exhibit 9 is a 
Commercial Security Bank escrow 
receipt bearing Reyns's signature, 
wherein she acknowledges receipt of 
1 the Quit Claim Deed. (Defs.' 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot, Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
3. Paragraph 30 of the Plaintiffs' 
statement of facts correctly states that 
"on or about October 6, 1983, when 
the purchase price was paid in full, the 
Warranty Deed, filed herewith as 
Exhibit "A", was delivered to Reyns." 
Additionally, this Warranty Deed, 
which conveyed the apartments from 
Ben Charlesworth to Ruth C. Reyns as 
to an undivided two-thirds interest, 
and to Ellen C. Isom as to an 
undivided one-third interest, was 
recorded the same day, 10 October 
1983, in the office of the Weber 
County Recorder at Book 1433, Page 




Charlesworths9 Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
3. Undisputed. 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
14 
| Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
Response to Pis.' First Req. for 
Admis. (Ex. 2) No. 6; Reyns Dep. at 
73:13-22, a true and correct copy of 
which is filed herewith as Exhibit 10.) 
i The escrow receipt states that the 
subject escrow has been paid in full, 
and notes that the following 
documents have been forwarded to 
Reyns: (a) the "Contract;" (b) 
"Warranty Deed Charlesworth to 
Reyns and Isom; and Quit Claim Deed 
Reyns to Shirlee [sic] Charlesworth" 
and (c) "Abstracts of Title." (Escrow 
Receipt (Ex. 9).) Appearing above 
Reyns's signature is the legend 
"Received enclosures above 
described:' (Id) 
33. Shirlie Charlesworth and the 
children never received the Quit Claim 
Deed. (Rennly Charlesworth Dep. at 
10:10-14, 11:7-10, a copy of which is 
filed herewith as Exhibit 11; Shirlie 
Charlesworth Dep. (Ex. 5) at 18:3-18.) 
34. In addition to the terms of the 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
4. Paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs' 
statement of facts states that "Shirlie 
Charlesworth and the children never 
received the quit claim deed." Even 
though she would have been under an 
obligation as the Trustee of the trust to 
protect and safeguard the trust 
interests, by her own admission, 
Shirlie Charlesworth took no action. 
See response to ^ 21 above. 
5. In response to paragraph 34, 
Charlesworths9 Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
4. In paragraph 4 of their 
statement of fact, Defendants agree 
with paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs' 
statement of fact, but mischaracterize 
Shirlie Charlesworth's purported 
duties. See Plaintiffs' response to 
paragraph 1 above. The Court should 
also note that it is undisputed that the 
Quitclaim Deed was delivered to 
Reyns. (Plfs.' Statement of Fact ffif 
31, 32 (Defendants do not dispute this 
fact).) 
5. In paragraph 5 of their 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 




Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
Escrow Agreement, the Quit Claim 
Deed, and the Escrow Receipt, 
Reyns's own actions support 
Plaintiffs' interest in the Partnership 
and the Property. Over a period of 
almost thirty years, Reyns engaged in 
a number of acts consistent with such 
interest and the terms of the Contract, 
the Partnership Agreement, and the 
Trust Agreement described above. 
For example, Reyns, as managing 
partner and on behalf of the 
Partnership, collected rents, made the 
payments due under the Contract, 
maintained the Property, and for 
twenty years paid the net profits, if 
any, to the partners annually. (Am. 
Compl. H 21; Answer to Am. Compl. ^ 
3.) Reyns paid one-third of the profits 
to herself, one-third to Isom (and later 
to her heirs), and one-third to the 
children. (Reyns Dep. (Ex. 10) at 
24:5-25:14,136:2-10.) Initially, 
Reyns delivered the profits to Shirlie 
Charlesworth's husband, who would 
deliver the payments to the children. 
(Id at 24:5-26:4.) Reyns began to 
deliver the payments directly to the 
children as they respectively reached 
their majority. Reyns continued 
making payments to the children until 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
the Court should note the last sentence 
thereof: "Reyns continued making 
payments to the children until at least 
1985 - over ten years after the 
youngest child had obtained his 
majority and sixteen years after the 
oldest child had attained his majority." 
It is an undisputed fact that no 
distributions, with the exception of 
one or two minimal checks, were 
made by Defendants to Plaintiffs after 
1985. Plaintiff Rennly J. 
Charlesworth testified as follows: 
Q. And you don't recall receiving 
any money from Rueli Investment, 
except maybe once or twice in a very 
small amount since your father's 
death? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And he passed away [when]? 
A. August 1985. 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
statement of fact, Defendants agree 
with paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs' 
statement of fact, but mischaracterize 
the issue of post 1985 distributions. 
Defendants contend that no 
distributions, except for one or two in 
small amounts, were made to Plaintiffs 
after 1985. Defendants'statement is 
inaccurate. First, the statement itself 
acknowledges that at least one or two 
distributions were in fact made after 
1985. Second, Defendants do not 
contest Plaintiffs' statement that the 
Schedule K-ls that Reyns delivered to 
Plaintiffs through 1993 reflected 
distributions in the form of 
adjustments to the Plaintiffs' capital 
accounts in the Partnership. (Plfs.' 
Statement of Fact ffi[ 35-37 
(Defendants do not dispute these 
facts).) Some years the K-ls reflected 
income to the Plaintiffs, while in 
others the K-ls reflected losses. (Id.) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
f, 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
at least 1985—over ten years after the 
youngest child had attained his 
majority and sixteen years after the 
oldest child had attained his majority. 
(Id at 32:24-33:19, 38:17-24.) 
35. Even though she ceased making 
outright payments to the children, 
Reyns continued to send them 
Schedules K-l of Form 1065, titled 
"Partner's Share of Income, Credits, 
Deductions, Etc.," (id at 38:23-39:2), 
which, as discussed below, reflected 
income to the children in the form of 
increased capital accounts and also 
expressly recited their status as 
general partners in the Partnership. 
36. In fact, Reyns provided 
Schedule K-l tax statements to the 
partners, including to each of the 
Plaintiffs, from the inception of the 
Partnership through the 1992 tax year. 
True and correct copies of samples of 
such K-l statements, including the 
1982, 1988, 1991, and 1992 K-ls for 
Rennly Charlesworth; the 1990, 1991, 
and 1992 K-ls for Jace Charlesworth; 
the 1988, 1989, 1991, and 1992 K-ls 
for Mirid Weidner; the 1991 and 1992 
K-ls for Gaylee McEwan; and the 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Undisputed. 
Undisputed. 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
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1991 and 1992 K-ls for Jack Gilles 
Charlesworth are filed herewith as 
Exhibit 12. (Reyns Dep. (Ex. 10) at 
92:3-13; 96:12-23; 101:2-9; 114:13-
17; 116:20-24; 118:23-119:9.) 
37. In each of these K-ls, the 
Plaintiffs were expressly referred to as 
"general partners." (Schedule K-ls 
(Ex. 12) Line A.) The K-ls also 
reflected that each of the Plaintiffs 
owned one-fifth of one-third (6.67%) 
of the profits, losses, and ownership of 
capital of the Partnership. (Id. Line C 
of 1982 K-l, Line E of 1988 and 1990 
K-ls, and Line F of remaining K-ls.) 
The K-ls further reflected that each of 
the Plaintiffs had a capital account, 
(14 Line E of 1982 K-l, Line K of 
1988 and 1990 K-ls, and Line J of 
remaining K-ls), and that each 
Plaintiff incurred income and/or 
losses, (id Lines 1-2). 
38. The Schedules K-l for all of the 
partners, including the children, were 
prepared by an accountant, however 
Reyns provided the accountant with 
the information appearing therein. 
(See, e.g., Reyns Dep. (Ex. 10) at 
89:7-14; 90:11-92:2; 97:24-98:7; 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Undisputed. 
Undisputed. 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
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101:2-9; 118:5-121:10.) Once the 
Partnership K-ls were prepared, 
Reyns reviewed them for accuracy 
before filing them with the federal 
government. (See, e.g., id. at 83:12-
84:6; 90:11-92:2; 94:25-95:18; 96:12-
23; 97:24-98:9.) She also directly sent 
each of the partners, including the 
children, their respective K-l forms. 
(See, e.g., id at 90:11-92:2; 95:13-18; 
96:12-23; 120:11-15.) 
39. In connection with the 
preparation of the Partnership's 1992 
tax return, Reyns recalls having a 
discussion with the Partnership's 
accountant about whether the children 
were general partners of the 
Partnership. She cannot recall the 
content of the conversation, however 
the accountant thereafter prepared the 
returns in a manner expressly 
reflecting the children's interest as 
general partners, and Reyns delivered 
the K-ls reflecting that interest to the 
children. (Id at 101:2-103:6.) 
(Reyns's Clandestine Transfer of 
Plaintiffs' Interest in the Property 
to The Reyns Family Trust) 
40. On August 27, 1985, 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Undisputed. 
6. Paragraph 40 of the Plaintiffs 
statement of fact correctly states that 
on 27 August 1985, Defendant Ruth 
Reyns conveyed her two-thirds 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
6. Undisputed. 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
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notwithstanding the Plaintiffs7 interest 
in the Partnership, Reyns conveyed by 
warranty deed a two-thirds interest in 
the Property to herself, Arie William 
Reyns, and Alan W. Reyns, as joint 
trustees under the Trust Agreement 
dated August 27, 1985 ("Reyns 
Family Trust"). (Answer to Am. 
Compl. 1] 12.) A true and correct copy 
of the warranty deed is filed herewith 
as Exhibit 13. 
41. The j oint trustees under the 
Reyns Family Trust tendered no 
consideration to the Partnership in 
connection with the transfer. (Am. 
Compl. U 26; Answer to Am. Compl. ^ 
3.) 
42. Notwithstanding the requirement 
in the Partnership Agreement that the 
Agreement not be modified absent the 
consent of all of the parties thereto and 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
interest in the property to a family 
trust established by her and her 
husband for estate planning purposes. 
See Exhibit 13. Said Warranty Deed 
was recorded in the office of the 
Weber County Recorder at Book 
1474, Page 807, as Entry Number 
946014 on 28 August 1985. See 
Exhibit 13. 
7. Paragraph 41 of the Plaintiffs 
statement of facts correctly states that 
the Reyns' family trust tendered no 
consideration to the partnership in 
return for the transfer of Ruth Reyns 
interest in said partnership. 
Additionally, when the documents 
were executed in 1963, the 
Charlesworth trust of which Shirlie J. 
Charlesworth was the trustee, gave no 
consideration for the transfer of any 
property or partnership interest to said 
trust. Deposition of Shirlie 
Charlesworth, 11:5-10. 
Undisputed. 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
7. Undisputed. 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
9 0 
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' their successors, Reyns did not obtain 
authorization from anyone, including 
the partners of the Partnership, to 
make the transfer. (Partnership 
Agreement (Ex. 3) ^ 8; Answer to Am. 
Comply 13.) 
43. Reyns did not give Shirhe 
Charlesworth or the children notice of 
the transfer. (Reyns Dep. (Ex. 10) 
81:17-21.) 
44. In fact, Reyns took affirmative 
steps to hide this transfer by 
continuing to provide Schedules K-l 
to the children, which Schedules 
reflected the children's continued 
interest in the Partnership, the 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
8. Paragraph 43 states that 
"Reyns did not give Shirhe 
Charlesworth or her children notice of 
the [transfer of her interest m the 
property to Reyns' family trust]." The 
transaction was a matter of public 
record by virtue of the recordation of 
the deed m the office of the Weber 
County Recorder on 28 August 1985. 
9. In paragraph 44 of the 
Plaintiffs statement of facts, the 
Plaintiffs claim that "Reyns took 
affirmative steps to hide this transfer" 
by providing schedules K-l to the 
children after 1985. Even though the 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
8. Plaintiffs do not dispute that 
Reyns failed to give Shirhe 
Charlesworth or Plaintiffs notice of 
Reyns's transfer of the Property to the 
Reyns family trust, but dispute the 
legal principal alleged by Defendants 
in this paragraph. Although the 
"transaction was a matter of public 
record" by virtue of the fact that it was 
recorded with the County Recorder, 
Plaintiffs contend that such recording 
did not operate to give them actual or 
constructive notice because the 
recording statute only affords such 
notice to those with a duty to 
investigate, such as a potential 
purchaser of the property. 
9. Plaintiffs dispute the 
allegations in paragraph 9 of 
Defendants' Statement of Facts to the 
extent they suggest that no payments 
were made to Plaintiffs after 1985, 
that such alleged fact should have 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
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Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
principal assets of which were the 
Contract and the Property purchased 
thereunder. (See supra ^ 36.) 
45. The transfer did not affect 
Isom's one-third interest in the 
Partnership Property. Isom retained 
her one-third interest in the Property 
after Reyns transferred the two-thirds 
interest in the Partnership Property to 
the Reyns Family Trust. (See Answer 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
children received schedules K-l, 
which in some instances reflected a 
distribution of capital to them, the 
undisputed evidence is that following 
1985 no payments were made to them. 
It is difficult to understand how receipt 
of a schedule K-l reflecting a 
distribution which one never received 
could be considered affirmative steps 
to hide the transfer." To the contrary, 
such discrepancy should have raised a 
question in Plaintiffs' minds. But, 
Plaintiffs took no action. Deposition 
of Rennly J. Charlesworth 6:11-24 
(stating that the only discussions since 
reaching the age of majority plaintiff 
Rennly Charlesworth had with 
Defendants occurred in 1994); 
Deposition of Shirlie J. Charlesworth 
11:1-4 (responding to question about 
discussions with Defendants in 1963, 
answering "we never discussed [the 
partnership] to much ever.)". 
Undisputed. 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
raised a question in Plaintiffs' minds, 
and that Plaintiffs' took no action. 
Each of these allegations is inaccurate, 
as explained in paragraphs 5-21 of 
Plaintiffs' Additional Statement of 
Fact below. 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
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to Am. Compl. H 17; infra ffi[ 46-54.) 
46. Isom died in 1988, causing a 
dissolution of the Partnership, 
l however the partnership was not 
wound up. (Am. Compl. % 29; Answer 
to Am. Compl. 1J3.) 
47. On January 4, 1990, Isom's 
personal representative and former 
husband, Raymond Isom, executed a 
deed transferring Isom's one-third 
interest in the Property to Raymond 
Isom, Patrick Isom, and Colleen 
Findley. (Am. Compl. ^ 29; Answer 
to Am. Compl. ^ 3.) 
(Sale of the Property Unbeknownst 
to the Plaintiffs) 
48. On or about June 6, 1996, the 
joint trustees of the Reyns Family 
Trust and Raymond Isom, 
respectively, sold and conveyed the 
entire Property to third parties. 
(Answer to Am. Compl. ^ 17.) 
49. A true and correct copy of the 
Real Estate Purchase Contract is filed 
herewith as Exhibit 14. (Reyns Dep. 
(Ex. 10) at 126:11-127:1.) A counter 
offer included in the Real Estate 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 





Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
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Purchase Contract signed by Reyns 
and her husband Arie William Reyns 
indicated that that the seller was "a 
partnership," namely "Ruell 
Investments," and clarified that the 
sale was "subject to the approval of all 
partners." (Counter Offer No. l,Real 
Estate Purchase Contract (Ex. 14) at 
5.) 
50. An addendum to the counter 
offer included in the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract memorialized that 
the seller's agreement to the sale was 
made by Reyns, and by Arie William 
Reyns, Raymond Isom, and Colleen 
Findley. (Reyns Dep. (Ex. 10) at 
129:10-22; Addendum to Counter 
Offer, Real Estate Purchase Contract 
(Ex. 14) at 6.) The Isom/Findleys 
stated that their approval of the sale 
was contingent on them receiving one-
third of the sale proceeds. (Addendum 
to Counter Offer, Real Estate Purchase 
Contract (Ex. 14) at 6.) 
51. The Property was transferred to 
the buyers through warranty deeds, 
two of which are filed herewith as 
Exhibit 15. The first was executed by 
Reyns, Arie William Reyns, and Alan 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Undisputed. 
Undisputed. 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 1 
(R. at 483-84) 
A 
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W. Reyns, as trustees of the Reyns 
Family Trust. The second was 
executed by Raymond E. Isom. 
(Reyns Dep. (Ex. 10) at 130:4-15, 
132:16-23.) Reyns believes that 
Colleen Findley and Patrick Isom may 
have also executed warranty deeds in 
favor of the buyers. (Id. at 132:24-
133:9.) 
52. Neither the joint trustees of the 
Reyns Family Trust nor Raymond 
Isom obtained authorization from the 
Plaintiffs to make such transfer of the 
Property. (Am. Compl. ^ 34; Answer 
to Am. Compl. U 3; R. Reyns Dep. at 
124:13-125:4.) 
53. The joint trustees of the Reyns 
Family Trust, Raymond Isom, Patrick 
Isom, and Colleen Findley together 
received consideration from the 
purchasers of the Property of 
$350,000, including cash in the 
amount of $297,500 and a promissory 
note in the amount of $52,500. 
(Reyns Dep. (Ex. 10) at 106:2-7, 
123:8-20; Real Estate Purchase 
Contract (Ex. 14) at 1.) 
54. One-third of the $297,000 cash 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 




Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
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Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
payment was paid to the Isoms, and 
the remainder was paid to the Reyns 
Family Trust. (Reyns Dep. (Ex. 10) at 
123:21-124:6.) The buyers later paid 
the balance of the purchase price, 
namely $52,500. (Id at 123:8-124:8.) 
The $52,500 was distributed to the 
Isoms and the Reyns Family Trust in 
the same proportion as the initial cash 
payment, namely one-third of the 
payment was made to the Isoms and 
two-thirds was made to the Reyns 
Family Trust. 
55. Reyns never gave Shirlie 
Charlesworth or the Plaintiffs notice 
of the sale of the Property. (Reyns 
Dep. (Ex. 10) at 125:25-126:5.) 
Plaintiffs did not learn of the sale until 
the summer of 1997 (Rennly 
Charlesworth Dep. (Ex. 11) at 8:10-
17.) 
56. Defendants have never paid any 
of the sale proceeds of the Property to 
Shirlie Charlesworth or Plaintiffs. 
(Am. Compl. ^ 37; Answer to Am. 
C o m p l y . ) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Undisputed. 
Undisputed. 
10. In addition to the foregoing 
acceptance of Plaintiffs' statement of 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot, Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
10. Paragraph 10 of 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. i 
(R. at 483-84) 
Undisputed. 
Ofs 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
facts, together with the above-
described clarifications, Defendants 
submit the following additional 
undisputed facts. 
11. In 1982 the contract on the 
apartments was paid off and the 
escrow agent, Commercial Security 
Bank, released the warranty deed and 
other deeds evidently, to Defendant 
Ruth Reyns. The deed conveying the 
property to Defendant Ruth Reyns and 
her sister Ellen Isom, now deceased, 
was then recorded in the office of the 
Weber County Recorder on 6 October 
1983 at Book 1433, Page 1443, as 
entry number 892145. 
12. Plaintiff Ruth C. Reyns 
conveyed her two-thirds interest in the 
property, arising under the deed 
recorded in 1982, to her family trust 
by way of a warranty deed dated 27 
August 1985, and recorded said deed 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
Defendants' Statement of Facts 
does not contain any factual 
averments. It merely reiterates that 
Defendants "accept[] Plaintiffs' 
statement of facts, together with 
the above-described clarifications." 
It then states that the remainder of 
Defendants' Statement of Facts 
consists of additional and 
purportedly undisputed facts. 
11. Plaintiffs do not dispute the 
allegations of paragraph 11 of 
Defendants' Statement of Fact, but 
emphasize that Defendants therein 
admit that Reyns took possession of 
the Quitclaim Deed meant for Shirlie 
Charlesworth by their admission that 
Commercial Security Bank released 
the "warranty deed and other deeds 
evidently, to Defendant Ruth Reyns." 
(Defs.' Statement of Facts % 11 
(emphasis added).) 
12. Undisputed, except to the 
extent Defendants claim that Reyns 
owned a two-thirds interest in the 
property, which issue is the subject of 
the parties' respective motions herein. 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 




Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
in the office of the Weber County 
Recorder on 28 August 1985, at Book 
1474, Page 807, as entry number 
946014. 
13. Plaintiff Rennly Charlesworth 
testified that even though he had an 
understanding that he was to have an 
accounting of the partnership every 
year, which he never received, he was 
"kind of always kept in the dark." His 
specific testimony was as follows: 
Q. Could you describe for me, 
Mr. Charlesworth, what specifically 
you believe [the Defendants] those 
individuals did to prevent you from 
acting or to induce you not to exercise 
your rights under those various 
documents [including the partnership 
agreement, purchase contract, and 
trust agreement and contract 
assignment]? 
Mr. Berger: To the extent you are 
calling for a legal conclusion, I will 
object, but the witness can testify as to 
his understanding. 
The Witness: My understanding is 
that technically [Defendant] Ruth 
[Reyns] and [Defendant] Bill [Reyns] 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
13. Plaintiffs do not dispute that 
Rennly Charlesworth testified as 
quoted. Plaintiffs do dispute, 
however, Defendants' characterization 
of that testimony as reflecting Mr. 
Charlesworth's understanding at the 
time of Reyns's defalcations. Instead, 
Mr. Charlesworth testified in the 
present tense. His testimony reflected 
his understanding at the time of his 
deposition (he stated "My 
understanding is . . ."), which 
understanding he gained only as a 
result of his discussions with counsel. 
(Rennly Charlesworth Aff. \ 30 
(emphasis added).) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
Undisputed. 
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Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
or whoever was in charge was 
supposed to actually, every year, give 
us some kind of accounting of the 
partnership which never happened. So 
we were kind of always in the dark. 
Also through the chain of events of 
things that have happened in the last 
eight or twelve months I believe that 
Ruth Reyns picked up a quit claim 
deed to my mother [1982] and it was 
never delivered to any of us. We were 
never aware of it. So I believe we 
were kept in the dark and that is how 
they tried to keep us from doing 
anything." 
14. Over a course of time, 
Plaintiffs had demanded an accounting 
which they did not receive. Moreover, 
they became suspicious about the 
nature of the management of the 
partnership because they were not 
receiving what they considered to be 
adequate or appropriate income from 
the partnership. Plaintiff Rennly 
Charlesworth testified as follows: 
Q: After the time you became 21 
years old, Mr. Charlesworth, did you 
ever request an accounting other than 
in this lawsuit you filed from Ruell 
Investment Co., or anyone associated 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
14. Disputed. Defendants contend 
that Plaintiffs did not receive the 
accounting they allegedly demanded. 
However, the very portion of Mr. 
Charlesworth's deposition testimony 
quoted by Defendants belies this 
assertion. Mr. Charlesworth testified 
that Plaintiffs did receive a response. 
This point is elaborated in paragraphs 
8-10 of Plaintiffs' Additional 
Statement of Fact below. Plaintiffs 
similarly contest Defendants' assertion 
that Plaintiffs had become suspicious 
of Defendants, as Plaintiffs explain in 
paragraphs 8-21 of Plaintiffs' 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
Undisputed. 
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Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
with it? 
A. I personally did not. 
Q: Do you now whether any of 
your brothers or sisters did? 
A: I believe my sister GayLee 
wrote a letter to them asking for an 
accounting. 
Q: Do you know when that 
would have been? 
A: I think it was 1988. I never 
saw it though. 
Q: Do you know what prompted 
that? 
A: Just the fact that we kept 
getting something every year saying 
the boiler broke, we don't have any 
money, we can't rent them out or 
needed a new roof or something like 
that. 
Q: These things would have 
caused the money that you were 
receiving to be reduced? 
A: Reduced or nonexistent. 
Q: Do you now whether GayLee 
got any response? 
A: The only response I can think 
of was a very curt letter to all of us 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (R. at 483-84) 
(R. at 372-82) 
Additional Statement of Fact below. 
1 Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
that year saying that one of us had 
questioned the integrity of Ruth and 
Bill and they were, you could tell, a 
little bit upset. That's really all I 
recall, is a paragraph on a Christmas 
card or something like that. 
Q: Do you recall receiving any 
financial information? 
A: No. They never - the only 
financial information we ever received 
were the K-l forms. 
15. Plaintiffs commenced the 
above-entitled action by filing a 
complaint in the Third Judicial District 
Court for Salt Lake County on 29 June 
1997. Venue was erroneous in Salt 
Lake and the case was subsequently 
transferred to Weber County and filed 
under its present case name and 
number. 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
15. Undisputed. 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
Plaintiffs Additional Statement of Fact 
1. Reyns served as the managing 
partner of the Partnership. In that 
capacity, she paid annual distributions 
of profits to each of the partners in the 
Partnership, including Plaintiffs. 
Reyns began making these annual 
distributions no later than 1964. 
1. Undisputed. 
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Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Charlesworths5 Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
(Plaintiffs' Affs. 1} 6.) 
2. Plaintiffs understood that their 
partnership interest was held for them 
in trust prior to the time they became 
21 years of age. During that time, 
Reyns annually forwarded 
distributions to be held in trust for 
them. (Id 11 7.) 
3. At or around the time each of 
the Plaintiffs became 21 years of age, 
Reyns began to deliver the annual 
partnership distributions directly to 
them. (Id 11 8.) 
4. Also at or around the time 
Plaintiffs became 21, Reyns began to 
deliver Schedule K-ls directly to 
them. These forms expressly stated 
that Plaintiffs were partners in the 
Partnership. (IcL1|9.) 
5. The annual partnership 
distributions continued through at least 
around 1985, which is over ten years 
after the youngest of the Plaintiffs 
turned 21. It is also very likely that 
Reyns made one or two small cash 
distributions to Plaintiffs after that 
date. (Id 11 10.) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 






1 Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
6. After the annual cash 
distributions ceased, Reyns continued 
sending the Plaintiffs Schedule K-ls. 
These forms continued to expressly 
state that the Plaintiffs were partners 
in the Partnership. The forms also 
reflected each of the Plaintiffs' share 
of Partnership distributions for the 
year. In some years, the forms 
reflected income to the Plaintiffs. In 
other years, they reflected a loss. 
Such income or loss was applied to the 
Plaintiffs' Partnership capital account 
balance reported on the Schedule K-l. 
QcLltll.) 
7. Isom passed away in 1988. 
The Plaintiffs understood that certain 
of her family members, including 
Raymond E. Isom, Patrick Isom, and 
Colleen Ruth Isom Findley, inherited 
or otherwise took control over Isom's 
one-third interest in the Partnership, 
and the Partnership continued. From 
that time forward, the Plaintiffs' 
understood that Reyns distributed one-
third of partnership income and losses 
to these members of Isom's family. 
QLH12.) 
8. In or around the fall of 1988, 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 





Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
the Plaintiffs observed that their cash 
distributions had ceased. Accordingly, 
Plaintiff GayLee McEwan, know 
known as GayLee Drezin, wrote a 
letter to Reyns seeking an explanation. 
(14113.) 
9. In response, the Plaintiffs 
received a letter from Reyns's 
husband, Defendant Arie William 
Reyns. The letter was dated 
December 9, 1988. A copy of the 
letter is attached to Plaintiffs' 
Affidavits as Exhibit A. As expressed 
in the December 9 letter, Reyns 
apparently took offense at the contents 
of GayLee's letter. Nevertheless, 
Reyns's letter contained a fair amount 
of detail. It explained that property 
taxes and maintenance costs had been 
rising. It also stated that, in light of 
federal low-income housing being 
built in the area, Reyns had to lower 
the rent for the Property. Finally, the 
letter disclosed to the Plaintiffs that 
Reyns was attempting to sell the 
Property, but had not received any 
serious offers. (Id. 1 14.) 
10. The explanation in the letter 
seemed reasonable and adequate to the 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 




1 Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 187-197) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem. 
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp. 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
Plaintiffs. Therefore, they did not 
inquire of Reyns any further 
concerning the matter. (Id U 15.) 
11. Subsequently, the Plaintiffs 
received another letter from Reyns's 
husband concerning the Property. 
This letter was dated December 10, 
1989. A copy of this letter is attached 
to Plaintiffs' Affidavits as Exhibit B. 
This letter similarly stated that the 
Partnership had incurred significant 
maintenance costs, and that the 
Property was experiencing a very high 
vacancy rate. The letter also noted 
that the Property was still for sale, but 
that no one had made any offers to 
purchase it. (Id. j^ 16.) 
12. The December 10 letter also 
confirmed the Plaintiffs' 
understanding that the Partnership 
continued after Isom's death. For 
example, the letter indicated that the 
Property was still being maintained 
and rented. The letter also indicated 
that the Partnership had taken out a 
loan that would be payable over the 
following four years. It also 
specifically noted: "The law here 
required us to have the property 
appraised after [Isom's] death for 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
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Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 339-346) 
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
probate. This cost is $600.00, and is 
paid for, however it is an expense that 
has to be shared." (Plaintiffs' 
Affidavits, Ex. B.) Thus, it indicated 
that the Plaintiffs would continue to 
share in the costs borne by the 
Partnership. (Id.1Jl7.) 
13. The Plaintiffs also recall 
receiving, from time to time, 
additional letters or notes from Reyns 
or her husband explaining the amount 
of their Partnership distributions. 
These communications often indicated 
that the distributions were small in 
light of the cost of maintaining the 
Property. ( Id^ 18.) 
14. During this time, and 
thereafter, the Plaintiffs continued to 
receive Schedule K-ls from Reyns. 
The K-ls expressly recited that they 
were partners in the Partnership. They 
also reflected income and losses added 
to or subtracted from their Partnership 
capital accounts. (Id, 11 19.) 
15. Reyns sent the Schedule K-1 s 
for each tax year through and 
including 1992. The Schedule K-l for 
the tax year 1992 was sent to Plaintiffs 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
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and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
in 1993. (Id H 20.) 
16. As of September of 1994, 
Plaintiffs had not received the 
Schedule K-l for the 1993 tax year. 
At that time, Plaintiff Rennly 
Charlesworth phoned Reyns and 
inquired as to when the Plaintiffs 
would be receiving their Schedule K-
ls. (KLH21.) 
17. During that telephone 
conversation, Reyns informed Mr. 
Charlesworth that the Partnership was 
"over." (Id 1| 22.) 
18. Prior to that time, neither 
Reyns nor anyone else had never 
indicated to Plaintiffs in any manner, 
either outright or by implication, nor 
did the Plaintiffs otherwise know or 
suspect, or have reason to know or 
suspect, that she or anyone else 
considered the Partnership "over," or 
that she was terminating, attempting to 
terminate, or had terminated the 
Partnership or their interest in the 
Partnership. To the contrary, she had 
indicated that the Plaintiffs were 
partners in the Partnership by sending 
them Schedule K-ls that reflected 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
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Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in 
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and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 372-82) 
their partnership status. (Id. ^ 23.) 
19. Subsequently, in the summer 
of 1997, and only after Mr. 
Charlesworth contacted a lawyer, the 
Plaintiffs learned that Reyns had sold 
the Property. The Plaintiffs also 
learned that Reyns kept two-thirds of 
the proceeds from this sale, and that 
she distributed the remaining one-third 
of the proceeds from the sale to the 
Isom family. (ML T[ 24.) 
20. Prior to discovering that 
Reyns had sold the Property, neither 
Reyns nor anyone else had ever 
indicated to the Plaintiffs in any 
manner, either outright or by 
implication, nor did the Plaintiffs 
otherwise know or suspect, nor have 
reason to know or suspect, that the 
Property had been sold, that the 
owners of the Property had changed in 
any manner, that Reyns or anyone else 
owned or claimed to own the Property 
separate and apart from the 
Partnership, that Reyns had executed 
and recorded deeds concerning the 
Property, or that she or anyone else 
claimed that the Plaintiffs no longer 
had an ownership interest in the 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
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Property. (Id 11 25.) 
21. Among other things, in light 
of the fact that Reyns is the Plaintiffs' 
aunt, in light of the fact that they 
therefore trusted her integrity 
implicitly, m light of the explanations 
they received concerning the amount 
of the Partnership distnbutions, in 
light of the fact that they had received 
annual distributions (either outright or 
as stated in a Schedule K-1) for over 
two decades, and m light of the 
Schedule K-ls that they received each 
year from Reyns that expressly recited 
their partnership status and their share 
of Partnership profits and losses, the 
Plaintiffs never knew or suspected, nor 
did they have reason to know or 
suspect, that Reyns considered the 
Partnership to be "over." For these 
same reasons, the Plaintiffs never 
suspected, nor did they have reason to 
suspect, that Reyns had executed and 
recorded conveyances concerning the 
Property, or that she had sold the 
Property and distributed the proceeds 
of the sale. Similarly, in light of the 
fact that Reyns apprised Plaintiffs of 
her efforts to sell the Property, 
Plaintiffs presumed she would apprise 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
(R. at 483-84) 
21. Undisputed. 
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them if in fact she found a buyer. (Id. 
126.) 
22. Once they learned of these 
events, and after struggling with the 
issue of whether to bring legal action 
against a family member, but feeling 
they had no alternative, the Plaintiffs 
brought this action. (IdL 1f 27.) 
23. Except as described below, 
none of the Plaintiffs was ever shown, 
nor were they privy to, any of the 
documents or deeds governing or 
related to the creation of the 
Partnership, the purchase of the 
Property, or the Trust Agreement 
concerning the same. Similarly, they 
were never apprised when the 
Partnership's Contract to purchase the 
Property had been satisfied. In 
reviewing his father's papers in or 
around 1985 to 1988 after his father 
had passed away, which was a very 
emotional time for him, Rennly 
Charlesworth came across an apparent 
draft of what he now believes was the 
Partnership Agreement. It was on 
onion skin paper and was almost 
illegible, and it was also unsigned. He 
therefore did not, and could not for the 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
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most part, review its terms. (Id. If 28.) 
24. To this date, none of the 
Plaintiffs have received any of the 
proceeds from the sale of the Property. 
011129.) 
Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply 
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 
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*1 In this partnership case, plaintiff appeals as of 
right from the circuit court's order granting 
summary disposition in favor of defendants. The 
circuit court ruled that plaintiffs claims were 
time-barred. We affirm. 
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant a 
motion for summary disposition under MCR 
2.116(C)(7) de novo to determine if the moving 
party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Rheaume v. Vandenberg, 232 Mich.App 417, 
420-421; 591 NW2d 331 (1998). When reviewing a 
motion under this rule, this Court considers all 
affidavits, pleadings and other documentary 
evidence submitted by the parties and, where 
applicable, construes the pleadings in favor of the 
nonmoving party. Id. at 421. Absent a disputed 
issue of fact, whether a cause of action is barred by 
a statute of limitations is a question of law that this 
Court reviews de novo. Colbert v. Conybeare Law 
Office, 239 Mich.App 608, 613-614; 609 NW2d 
Page 1 
208 (2000). Further, this Court reviews the 
interpretation of statutes de novo as a question of 
law. Id. at 614. 
In August 1978, plaintiff and defendant Kenneth 
Pelland formed a Michigan partnership called 
"Pelland & Michael," for the purpose of "acquiring, 
owning, developing and selling for a profit a vacant 
parcel of property" located on Cogswell Road in the 
city of Wayne. In September 1978, the partnership 
acquired the property for $40,650. The partnership 
paid a cash down payment of $7,000, made a 
prepayment of principal in the amount of $4,788, 
and financed the remaining balance on land 
contract. The partnership paid these sums from 
capital contributed by both plaintiff and Kenneth 
Pelland. 
Through the middle of 1980, both plaintiff and 
Kenneth Pelland contributed equal amounts of 
capital into the partnership, in order to make the 
regular land contract payments, pay the property 
taxes, and cover other professional fees. At that 
time, the relationship between the partners broke 
down. In an effort to dissolve the partnership, 
plaintiff offered to either purchase Kenneth 
Pelland's interest in the partnership or sell his 
interest in the partnership to Kenneth Pelland. 
When the partners could not negotiate a purchase or 
a sale of partnership interest, plaintiff stopped 
contributing capital to the partnership. After July 
1980, Kenneth Pelland made all of the land contract 
installment payments and paid all the property taxes. 
In December 1983, Kenneth Pelland executed a 
land contract assignment that conveyed the 
partnership's interest in the property to himself and 
his wife, Winifred Pelland. Although plaintiff did 
not consent to the conveyance, letters exchanged 
between the parties' counsel at that time 
demonstrate that plaintiff was aware of the 
conveyance. In October 1984, the land contract 
vendors, Joseph L. Hayden and Lucille M. Hayden, 
conveyed the property to defendants by warranty 
deed. Defendants remained the owners of the 
property until they sold it in 1995 to Ford Motor 
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Company. The instant action followed. 
*2 The circuit court granted summary disposition 
to defendants, ruling that plaintiffs claims were 
time-barred. On appeal, the pivotal issue is when 
the applicable statute of limitations began to run. 
Plaintiff argues that his claims arose in 1995; 
defendants counter that plaintiffs claims arose in 
1983. We conclude that defendants' argument is 
correct. Plaintiffs claims arose in 1983, and are 
therefore time-barred. 
As an initial matter, M.C.L. § 600.5827 provides 
that a claim accrues when the wrong is done, 
without regard to when the damage results. The 
term "wrong," as used in the accrual provision, 
refers to the date on which the plaintiff was harmed 
by the defendant's act, not the date on which the 
defendant acted. Stephens v. Dixon, 449 Mich. 531, 
534-535; 536 NW2d 755 (1995). Two statutes of 
limitation are potentially applicable here. Pursuant 
to M.C.L. § 600.5807(8), a wronged party has six 
years to bring suit to recover damages or sums due 
for a breach of contract. That six-year period begins 
to run on the date the contract was breached. Dewey 
v. Tabor, 226 Mich.App 189, 193; 572 NW2d 715 
(1997). Further, the six-year "catchall" statute of 
limitations contained in M.C.L. § 600.5813 applies 
when the right to recovery arises from a statute. 
National Sand, Inc v. Nagel Construction, Inc, 182 
Mich.App 327, 337 n 7; 451 NW2d 618 (1990). 
Regardless of which limitation period applies here, 
we conclude that plaintiffs suit is time-barred. 
In December 1983, Kenneth Pelland executed a 
land contract assignment that conveyed the 
partnership's interest in the partnership property to 
himself and his wife. MCL 449.10(1) states the 
following regarding the conveyance of a 
partnership's real property: 
Where title to real property is in the partnership 
name, any partner may convey a title to such 
property by a conveyance executed in the 
partnership name; but the partnership may 
recover such property unless the partner's act 
binds the partnership under the provisions of 
paragraph [1] of section 9, [FN1] or unless such 
property has been conveyed by the grantee or a 
person claiming through such grantee to a holder 
for value without knowledge that the partner, in 
making the conveyance, has exceeded his 
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FN1. MCL 449.9. 
Further, M.C.L. § 449.9(1) states: 
Every partner is an agent of the partnership for 
the purpose of its business, and the act of every 
partner, including the execution in the partnership 
name of any instrument, for apparently carrying 
on in the usual way the business of the 
partnership of which he is a member binds the 
partnership, unless the partner so acting has in 
fact no authority to act for the partnership in the 
particular matter, and the person with whom he is 
dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no 
such authority. 
Finally, M.C.L. § 449.9(2) states: 
An act of a partner which is not apparently for the 
carrying on of the business of the partnership in 
the usual way does not bind the partnership unless 
authorized by the other partners. 
*3 The evidence indicates that Kenneth Pelland 
was not carrying on partnership business in the 
usual manner, he was not authorized by plaintiff to 
make the conveyance, and defendants were not 
bona fide purchasers. MCL 449.9(1); MCL 449.9(2) 
; MCL 449.10(1). Thus, Kenneth Pelland lacked 
authority to convey the property to himself and his 
wife. According to the language of M.C.L. § 
449.10(1), the partnership therefore had a claim to 
"recover" the property. Backowski v. Solecki, 112 
MicLApp 401, 406-408; 316 NW2d 434 (1982). 
The applicable statutes do not say that the 
conveyance is "void" and that the real property 
remains in the partnership, as plaintiff claims. 
Instead, the unauthorized conveyance gave plaintiff 
a right to file a circuit court action on behalf of the 
partnership, in order to "recover" the property. 
MCL 449.10(1). In fact, a letter from 1983, drafted 
and sent by plaintiffs then counsel, admitted 
knowledge of the conveyance as well as the 
applicable rule of law: 
It is our position that Mr. Pelland's conveyance of 
the partnership's interest in the land contract was 
made without authority and is therefore voidable. 
It is our intention, if necessary, to commence an 
action in the name of the partnership against Mr. 
Pelland for recovery of the property. 
This correspondence illustrates that plaintiff was 
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aware of the conveyance and his cause of action 
under M.C.L. §449.10(1). 
A claim accrues when the wrong is done. MCL 
600.5827. Because Kenneth Pelland did not have 
authority to convey the property to himself and his 
wife in 1983, and because plaintiff was aware of the 
conveyance and his cause of action under M.C.L. § 
449.10(1), plaintiffs claim clearly accrued in 1983. 
Plaintiff had six years to bring suit under a breach 
of partnership contract theory pursuant to M.C.L. § 
600.5807(8), or six years under M.C.L. § 600.5813 
under a theory arising from a statute, namely the 
applicable portions of the Uniform Partnership Act. 
M.C.L. § 449.1 et seq. Therefore, plaintiffs suit 
became time-barred in 1989. MCL 600.5807(8); 
MCL 600.5813. 
Plaintiff claims that the statute of limitations did 
not begin to run until defendants conveyed the 
property to Ford in 1995. Plaintiffs argument is 
based on his theory that the real property in 
question remained in the partnership until that 
point. We disagree. Under M.C.L. § 449.10(1), 
"any partner may convey a title to such [real] 
property by a conveyance executed in the 
partnership name." Although Kenneth Pelland 
wrongly transferred the property to himself and his 
wife, under M.C.L. § 449.10(1), title to the 
partnership property was transferred out of the 
partnership and the transfer was not void. The plain 
language of the statute explains that in these 
circumstances, after the transfer, the partnership 
"may recover" the property. Despite threatening to 
file suit to recover the property, plaintiff never did 
so. Contrary to plaintiffs assertion, the property is 
no longer recoverable. MCL 449.10(1); MCL 
600.5807(8); MCL 600.5813. Despite the fact that 
the sale of the property in 1995 allows plaintiff to 
more easily estimate his monetary damages, it is 
"the fact of identifiable and appreciable loss, and 
not the finality of monetary damages, that gives 
birth to the cause of action." Luick v. Rademacher, 
129 Mich.App 803, 806; 342 NW2d 617 (1983). 
*4 Relying on M.C.L. § 449.30, plaintiff also 
argues that his action for an accounting cannot 
begin to run until after the dissolution and winding 
up of the partnership. The statute provides: "[o]n 
dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but 
continues until the winding up of partnership affairs 
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is completed." MCL 449.30. Plaintiff claims that 
the partnership was never dissolved and that there 
was no winding up period. Therefore, plaintiff 
argues that the statute of limitations has not yet 
begun to run. We disagree. 
MCL 449.43 provides that the right to an 
accounting accrues at the date of dissolution of the 
partnership: 
The right, to an account of his interest shall 
accrue to any partner, or his legal representative, 
as against the winding up partners or the 
surviving partners or the person or partnership 
continuing the business, at the date of dissolution, 
in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. 
Further, M.C.L. § 449.29 describes the meaning of 
the term "dissolution": 
The dissolution of a partnership is the change in 
the relation of the partners caused by any partner 
ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as 
distinguished from the winding up of the business. 
Here, the evidence indicates a definite "change in 
the relation of the partners" in 1983, when Kenneth 
Pelland transferred the real property out of the 
partnership, to himself and his wife. MCL 449.29. 
Although Kenneth Pelland's act was wrongful, title 
to the only partnership asset was transferred out of 
the partnership. MCL 449.10(1). The law is well 
settled that when a partnership no longer holds 
assets or ceases to do the business for which it was 
organized, a partnership is dissolved. Schwier v. 
Hurlburt, 184 Mich. 698, 702; 151 NW 603 (1915); 
Potter v. Tolbert, 113 Mich. 486, 489; 71 NW 849 
(1897). Because Kenneth Pelland made an 
affirmative act to remove himself from a 
two-partner partnership, because the partnership no 
longer had any assets, and because plaintiff had 
stopped contributing capital to the partnership 
despite the terms of the partnership agreement, the 
evidence overwhelmingly shows that the 
partnership was "dissolved" in 1983. 
Moreover, in a suit for dissolution and an 
accounting of an alleged partnership, our Supreme 
Court held that a claim for undistributed profits 
which the plaintiff failed to assert for six years from 
the time the partnership stopped doing business was 
presented too late. Swiatkowski v. Kroll, 331 Mich. 
179, 183; 49 NW2d 128 (1951). This instant case is 
similar, although over sixteen years passed from the 
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time when the pairtnership could be considered 
"dissolved." Hence, like Swiatkowski, this matter 
was presented too late, and plaintiffs argument that 
the partnership is still intact, and that this suit can 
still be instituted, is incorrect. Id. 
Plaintiff also argues that this Court should interpret 
his claims as mixed questions of law and fact, and 
should allow further factual development in the 
circuit court. However, because plaintiffs suit 
became time-barred in 1989, further factual 
development would be futile. Our Supreme Court 
discussed the policies underlying the statute of 
limitations, as follows: 
*5 Statutes of limitations are intended to "compel 
the exercise of a right of action within a 
reasonable time so that the opposing party has a 
fair opportunity to defend"; "to relieve a court 
system from dealing with 'stale' claims, where the 
facts in dispute occurred so long ago that 
evidence was either forgotten or manufactured"; 
and to protect "potential defendants from 
protracted fear of litigation." [Moll v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 444 Mich. 1, 14; 506 NW2d 816 
(1993), quoting Bigelow v. Walraven, 392 Mich. 
566, 576; 221 NW2d 328 (1974).] 
The limitations period here expired in 1989, over 
ten years before plaintiff filed his complaint. This is 
an example of the type of stale claim that statutes of 
limitation were meant to prevent. Plaintiffs claims 
are time-barred and summary disposition was 
appropriate. Moll, supra at 14; Bigelow, supra at 
576. 
Affirmed. 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
GARY PORTER CONSTRUCTION dba Porter & 
Sons, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-
appellant, 
v. 
FOX CONSTRUCTION, INC.; and National 
Surety Corp., Defendants, Appellants, and 
Cross-appellees. 
No. 20030071-CA. 
Oct. 7, 2004. 
Background: Excavation subcontractor brought 
action against general contractor for public 
university's construction project, asserting claims 
for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and breach 
of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Subcontractor later amended complaint to add claim 
against surety that issued payment bond. The Third 
District, Salt Lake Department, William B. Bohling, 
J., granted subcontractor's motion for summary 
judgment as to claims against general contractor 
and granted surety's motion for summary judgment. 
General contractor and subcontractor appealed, and 
appeals were consolidated. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Billings, P.J., held 
that: 
(1) general contractor's failure to comply with 
Judicial Administration Rule governing opposition 
to motion for summary judgment did not warrant 
admitting all material facts set forth in 
subcontractor's statement; 
(2) contract implied in fact existed; 
(3) testimony by general contractor's vice 
president amounted to inadmissible hearsay; 
Page 1 
(4) subsequent mutual agreement between general 
contractor and excavation subcontractor did not 
constitute parol evidence; 
(5) discovery rule did not apply regarding claim 
against surety; and 
(6) amended complaint would relate back to 
original complaint if surety had constructive or 
actual notice during limitations period that it would 
have been a proper party to original complaint. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
[1] Appeal and Error €=>842(2) 
30k842(2) Most Cited Cases 
[1] Appeal and Error €=>934(1) 
30k934(l) Most Cited Cases 
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
Supreme Court views all facts and reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party and reviews the 
trial court's conclusions of law for correctness. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). 
[2] Motions 0=>\ 
267k 1 Most Cited Cases 
Trial court has discretion in requiring compliance 
with Judicial Administration Rule setting forth 
uniform procedures for motions and supporting 
memoranda. Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 
(Repealed). 
[3] Costs €=^194.18 
102k 194.18 Most Cited Cases 
Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the 
sound discretion of the trial court. 
[4] Appeal and Error €=>984(5) 
30k984(5) Most Cited Cases 
Trial court's calculation of reasonable attorney fees 
will not be overturned in the absence of a showing 
of a clear abuse of discretion. 
[5] Judgment €=>183 
228kl83 Most Cited Cases 
General contractor's failure to comply with Judicial 
Administration Rule requiring party opposing 
motion for summary judgment to set forth in 
opposing memorandum movant's statement of facts 
followed by concise statement of materials facts 
which support contention that genuine issue of 
materials facts exist did not warrant admitting all 
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material facts set forth in subcontractor's statement 
of undisputed facts in subcontractor's action that 
was brought against general contractor for breach of 
contract, quantum meruit, and breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; some of the 
facts general contractor set forth in separate section 
of memorandum had appropriate record citations, 
and general contractor had asserted that those facts 
created disputed factual issues. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 56(c); Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 
(repealed). 
[6] Contracts €=>27 
95k27 Most Cited Cases 
Contract implied in fact existed between general 
contractor and excavation subcontractor whereby 
subcontractor would be provided compensation 
beyond that stated in subcontract for work 
performed that was not listed in subcontract; 
general contractor requested that subcontractor 
perform work not listed in subcontract, 
subcontractor expected additional compensation for 
work performed that was not listed in subcontract, 
and general contractor knew or should have known 
that subcontractor expected additional 
compensation. 
[7] Contracts €=>2 7 
95k27 Most Cited Cases 
To succeed on excavation subcontractor's claim 
that was brought against general contractor and that 
was based on contract implied in fact, subcontractor 
was required to show that (1) general contractor 
requested subcontractor to perform the work under 
provision that were not included in accepted bid, (2) 
subcontractor expected additional compensation 
from general contractor for the work, and (3) 
general contractor knew or should have known that 
subcontractor expected additional compensation. 
[8] Evidence €=>317(2) 
157k317(2) Most Cited Cases 
Testimony by general contractor's vice president 
concerning conversations between general 
contractor's project manager and excavation 
subcontractor amounted to inadmissible hearsay and 
thus was not admissible in subcontractor's action 
against general contractor for breach of contract 
implied in fact. 
[9] Evidence €=^445(7) 
157k445(7) Most Cited Cases 
Subsequent mutual agreement between general 
contractor and excavation subcontractor to strike 
section from subcontract after they discovered that 
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section had been included in subcontract by mistake 
did not constitute "parol evidence" in 
subcontractor's action for breach of contract implied 
in fact; agreement was not a contemporaneous or 
prior conversation, representation, or statement. 
[10] Limitation of Actions €=>95(9) 
241k95(9) Most Cited Cases 
Discovery rule did not apply and thus did not toll 
one-year limitations period for excavation 
subcontractor to bring action against surety that 
issued payment bond to general contractor 
regarding public university's construction project; 
given its experience, subcontractor should have 
known that payment bond was required for 
construction of public structures, and 
subcontractor's attempt to obtain copy of bond from 
general contractor and university demonstrated that 
it knew of bond when it was considering litigation. 
West's U.C.A. §§ 63-56- 38(4), 63-56-39. 
[Ill Limitation of Actions €^=>95(1) 
241k95(l) Most Cited Cases 
In certain circumstances, the discovery rule tolls 
the statute of limitations period until facts forming 
the basis for the cause of action are discovered. 
[12] Limitation of Actions €=^95(1) 
241k95(l) Most Cited Cases 
Under the discovery rule, it is a threshold issue 
whether the plaintiff knew or should have known 
about its cause of action before the statute of 
limitations ran. 
[13] Appeal and Error €=>959(1) 
30k959(l) Most Cited Cases 
Abuse-of-discretion standard applies to trial court's 
decision regarding whether to allow amendment of 
pleadings. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(a). 
[14] Appeal and Error €=*863 
30k863 Most Cited Cases 
Correctness standard of review applies to trial 
court's decision on summary judgment regarding 
whether amendment to pleadings relates back to 
date of original filing for limitations purposes. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c). 
[15] Limitation of Actions €=?124 
241kl24 Most Cited Cases 
Test for relation back of amended pleading for 
limitations purposes includes whether (1) the 
amended pleading alleged only claims that arose out 
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth 
or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading 
and (2) the added party had received actual or 
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constructive notice that it would have been a proper 
party to the original pleading such that no prejudice 
would result from preventing the new party from 
using a statute-of-limitations defense that otherwise 
would have been available. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
15(c). 
[16] Limitation of Actions €=>121(2) 
24lkl21(2) Most Cited Cases 
Misnomer cases, in which party seeks to amend 
pleadings to name correct opposing party, are 
analyzed under procedural rule governing relation 
back of pleadings for limitations purposes, and the 
analysis focuses upon whether there was sufficient 
notice to the real party of interest so that relation 
back is not prejudicial. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c). 
[17] Limitation of Actions €=>124 
24lkl24 Most Cited Cases 
Where a new party had sufficient notice that it 
would have been a proper party to the original 
pleading, the purpose of the statute of limitations is 
not defeated by applying the relation-back doctrine 
to deprive the new party of its statute-of-limitations 
defense. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c). 
[18] Limitation of Actions €=^124 
24lkl24 Most Cited Cases 
Excavation subcontractor's amended complaint, 
which would have added as a defendant surety that 
issued payment bond on public university's 
construction project, would relate back to original 
complaint against general contractor if surety had 
constructive or actual notice during limitations 
period that it would have been a proper party to 
original complaint. West's U.C.A. § 63-56- 38(4); 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c). 
[19] Limitation of Actions €=>124 
24lkl24 Most Cited Cases 
Notice transfer test, under which party named in 
original pleading and party to be named in amended 
pleading are to closely related in their business 
operations that notice of action against one serves to 
provide notice to the other for purposes of relation 
back for limitations purposes, is not satisfied by 
general contractor-surety relationship alone. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c). 
[20] Limitation of Actions €=^124 
241kl24 Most Cited Cases 
Whether party named in original pleading and 
party to be named in amended pleading shared 
counsel prior to running of limitations period could 
be relevant to imputing notice to party to be named 
in amended pleading for purposes of whether 
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amended pleading would relate back to date that 
original pleading was filed. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
15(c). 
Jeffery R. Price and Michael E. Bostwick, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellants. 
Brian W. Steffensen, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
*1 f 1 Fox Construction, Inc. (Fox) appeals from 
a trial court order granting summary judgment to 
Gary Porter Construction Porter. We affirm. Porter 
appeals from a trial court order granting summary 
judgment and awarding attorney fees to National 
Surety Corporation National. We reverse in part 
and remand. The appeals have been consolidated. 
BACKGROUND 
U 2 The University of Utah the University 
contracted with Fox for the construction of a 
Women's Gymnastics Training Facility the Facility 
on the University campus. As required by Utah 
Code section 63-56-38 and its contract with the 
University, Fox and its surety, National, issued a 
payment bond the Bond for the benefit of persons 
supplying labor and material for construction of the 
Facility. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38 (1997). 
H 3 Fox entered into a subcontract with Porter 
whereby Porter was to perform various excavation 
and soil placement services. Specifically, the 
subcontract required Porter to "furnish and install 
all materials, equipment and labor per plans, 
specification sections 02000, 02070, 02230, 02601, 
02680, 02700 and 02721 and addendums 1 and 2" 
Included Sections for the sum of $146,740.00. 
Subsequently, Fox and Porter mutually agreed that 
section 02680 had been included by mistake, and as 
a result, Porter did no work specified in that section. 
After work on the Facility had begun, Fox also 
asked Porter to perform additional work under 
sections 02300, 02665, and 02711 Excluded 
Sections, none of which were included in the 
subcontract or the bid. 
U 4 When Porter invoiced Fox for its work, it 
identified the specific work done, the costs of the 
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work by line item, and the particular section under 
which the work had been performed. At times, Fox 
verbally acknowledged that Porter was performing 
work outside the subcontract. Until sometime in 
early 1998, Fox paid for all work done by Porter, 
whether it fell under Excluded Sections or Included 
Sections. Thereafter, numerous disputes over 
payments arose between Fox and Porter. In short, 
Porter claimed that Fox owed it payments in 
addition to the $146,740.00 for work it had done 
under the Excluded Sections, and Fox claimed that 
because these sections had been mistakenly 
excluded from the subcontract when Fox had 
drafted it, Fox owed Porter no additional amounts. 
The last day Porter worked on the Facility was May 
16, 1999. 
% 5 Sometime in early spring of 1999, Porter 
verbally requested information on the Bond from 
Fox because it planned to file a lawsuit. On April 
23, 1999, Porter sent a letter to the University 
requesting information on the Bond. The University 
forwarded the letter to Fox, but neither Fox nor the 
University provided Porter information on the 
Bond. In May 1999, Porter again verbally requested 
information on the Bond from Fox. Fox again did 
not provide the information to Porter. 
f 6 Porter filed its complaint against Fox on 
March 16, 2000, alleging breach of contract, 
quantum meruit, and breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. Porter did not make a claim 
upon the Bond at this time. In late June 2000, Fox 
provided Porter a copy of the Bond pursuant to a 
discovery request. Approximately six months later 
on January 12, 2001, Porter filed a motion to amend 
its complaint, which was unopposed and ultimately 
granted. On March 14, 2001, Porter filed its 
amended complaint naming National as a party and 
making a claim upon the Bond. 
*2 K 7 Porter moved for summary judgment on its 
claims against Fox. The trial court granted Porter's 
motion. Fox appeals. 
U 8 National moved for summary judgment 
against Porter based upon its affirmative defense 
that the statute of limitations barred Porter's claim 
upon the Bond. The trial court granted National's 
motion after it concluded that (1) Porter had no 
legal justification for failing to name National and 
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make a claim upon the Bond in its original 
complaint against Fox, which would have been 
timely; and (2) no identity of interest existed 
between National and Fox, and thus Porter's 
amended complaint did not relate back to its 
original complaint against Fox as required under 
rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
trial court then awarded attorney fees to National. 
Porter appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
U 9 First, Fox argues that the trial court erred by 
granting summary judgment to Porter after 
concluding that Fox had failed (1) to comply with 
rule 4- 501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration [FN1] or (2) to create a material 
dispute with its additional facts. Second, Porter 
argues that the trial court erred by granting 
summary judgment to National after concluding that 
Porter's claims against National were barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations. 
[1][2] % 10 Motions for summary judgment should 
be granted when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we 
view all facts and reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party and review the trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness. See Lovendahl 
v. Jordan Sch. Dist, 2002 UT 130,H 13, 63 P.3d 
705. However, "the trial court has discretion in 
requiring compliance with rule 4-501 [of the Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration]." Fennell v. 
Green, 2003 UT App 291.H 9, 77 P.3d 339. 
[3][4] H 11 Porter also challenges the trial court's 
calculation of attorney fees awarded to National. 
"Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the 
sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be 
overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear 
abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 
764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Fox's Appeal 
K 12 The trial court granted Porter's motion for 
summary judgment on two separate grounds. First, 
the trial court ruled that Fox had failed to comply 
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with rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration. Second, the trial court concluded 
that Fox had not created a material dispute with the 
additional facts it had submitted. We address each 
ground. 
A.Rule4-501(2)(B) 
[5] U 13 When summary judgment papers were 
filed in this case, rule 4- 501(2)(B) read as follows: 
The points and authorities in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a verbatim restatement of 
each of the movant's statement of facts as to 
which the party contends a genuine issue exists 
followed by a concise statement of material facts 
which support the party's contention. Each 
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered 
sentences and shall specifically refer to those 
portions of the record upon which the opposing 
party relies. All material facts set forth in the 
movant's statement and properly supported by an 
accurate reference to the record shall be deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment 
unless specifically controverted by the opposing 
party's statement. 
*3 Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(B) (2002). 
Because Fox did not "begin with a section that 
contains a verbatim restatement of each of [Porter's] 
statement of facts ... followed by a concise 
statement of material facts which support [Fox's] 
contention [that a genuine issue of facts exists]," the 
trial court concluded that Fox had failed to comply 
with rule 4-501; for this reason, the trial court 
admitted "[a] 11 the material facts set forth in 
[Porter's] statement" of undisputed facts. Id. Based 
upon this admission, the trial court ruled that there 
were no disputed issues of fact and that Fox was 
thereby entitled to summary judgment. 
U 14 Two cases decided after the trial court's 
ruling support the trial court's conclusion that it had 
discretion to admit facts not "specifically 
controverted" in the manner outlined in rule 
4-501(2)(B). In Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. District, 
2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705, the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled that the trial court had properly 
admitted the moving party's facts because these 
facts were not " 'specifically controverted by the 
opposing party's statement.' " Id. at f 50 (quoting 
Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(B) (2002)). 
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Similarly, in Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, 
77 P.3d 339, this court held that the trial court had 
not "abused its discretion in requiring compliance 
with rule 4-501 and thus ruling that the facts, as 
stated in [the moving party's] motions and 
supporting memoranda, were deemed admitted." Id. 
at % 9. Specifically, it was not an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to admit all of the 
moving party's facts when the nonmoving party's 
opposition papers did "not refer to [the moving 
party's] statements of uncontroverted facts, but 
instead included only [its] own statement of 
undisputed facts ... [leaving] it unclear what facts ... 
were disputed." Id. at ^ 7. 
T| 15 Both Lovendahl and Fennell support the 
conclusion that the trial court in this case did not 
abuse its discretion in enforcing rule 4-501(2)(B) by 
admitting Porter's facts as undisputed when Fox 
failed to comply with the rule. However, the Utah 
Supreme Court has since interpreted rule 
4-501(2)(B), without mentioning these prior cases, 
in a somewhat more relaxed way. See Salt Lake 
County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23,K 
23 n. 4, 89 P.3d 155. As the Court explained in 
Metro West, even where an 
opposing memorandum [does} not set forth 
disputed facts listed in numbered sentences in a 
separate section as required [by the rule, as long 
as] the disputed facts [are] clearly provided in the 
body of the memorandum with applicable record 
references, ... failure to comply with the technical 
requirements of rule 4-501(2)(B) [is] harmless. 
Id. [FN2] Because some of the facts Fox set forth 
in a separate section had appropriate record 
citations, which Fox asserts create disputed issues 
of material fact, under Metro West the trial court 
abused its discretion to enforce rule 4-501(2)(B) 
when it admitted Porter's undisputed facts because 
Fox failed to comply with rule 4-501. Thus, we 
must examine whether Fox's additional "facts are 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of 
[Porter]." Id. 
B. Fox's Additional Facts 
*4 [6] H 16 The trial court also concluded that the 
additional facts submitted by Fox do not create a 
material dispute. We agree. 
[7] K 17 Porter argues that Fox owes additional 
compensation for work it did under the Excluded 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Sections based upon a contract implied in fact. 
[FN3] To succeed on this claim, Porter must show 
that (1) Fox requested Porter to perform the work 
under the Excluded Sections, (2) Porter expected 
additional compensation from Fox for the work, and 
(3) Fox knew or should have known that Porter 
expected additional compensation. See Davies v. 
Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct.App.1987). The 
facts provided by Porter satisfy all of these elements 
and are not properly controverted by Fox. 
K 18 In its moving papers, Porter set forth the 
following facts, with appropriate record citations: 
(1) Jeff Wood, Fox's project manager, drafted the 
subcontract which contains only the Included 
Sections; (2) Fox repeatedly asked Porter to 
perform work outside the subcontract under the 
Excluded Sections; (3) Porter performed all work 
identified in the subcontract as well as the requested 
work under the Excluded Sections; (4) for months, 
Fox reviewed and paid line-item bills from Porter 
which identified the work performed, the costs of 
the work, and the specific section under which the 
work was done; (5) at times, Fox acknowledged that 
Porter was performing work outside the 
subcontract; and (6) the total cost of the work 
performed by Porter was $296,750.00, and the 
amount Fox paid Porter was $135,441.62, leaving a 
balance of $161,309.08. 
U 19 The additional facts submitted by Fox do not 
create a material dispute regarding any of the three 
elements required for Porter's implied-in-fact 
contract claim. Fox does not dispute that it 
requested Porter to perform work under the 
Excluded Sections; and Fox provides no facts to 
dispute Porter's claim that Porter expected 
additional compensation for the work under the 
Excluded Sections. However, Fox does attempt to 
dispute the third element- whether Fox knew or 
should have known that Porter expected additional 
compensation. 
[8] H 20 Most of the facts Fox provides in its 
opposition papers come from the deposition 
testimony of Floyd Cox, the Vice President of Fox. 
However, much of Cox's testimony is inadmissible. 
Cox testifies about conversations between Wood 
and Gary Porter, [FN4] as well as positions taken 
by the University, regarding Porter's work under the 
Excluded Sections. This testimony is inadmissible 
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hearsay, to which Porter objected in its reply 
memorandum and with a separate motion to strike, 
and therefore it cannot create a disputed issue of 
material fact. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (requiring 
that facts set forth be admissible to defeat summary 
judgment). 
[9] K 21 In the relevant admissible evidence 
remaining, Cox states that one Excluded Section, 
"section 2300[ ], had been left out of the 
subcontract;" and Wood states "that there was a 
section of specifications that was left out of the 
subcontract by mistake." Neither statement creates a 
material dispute over whether the Excluded 
Sections are part of the subcontract because they do 
not explain how the mistakes occurred despite 
ordinary diligence on the part of Fox. See Oliphant 
v. Estate of Brunetti, 2002 UT App 375,U 21, 64 
P.3d 587 (explaining that to change the express 
terms of a contract due to unilateral mistake, "the 
mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the 
exercise of ordinary diligence by the party making 
the mistake" (quotations and citation omitted)). 
Also, because Fox presents no evidence that Porter 
should have known about Fox's mistake either when 
it entered into the subcontract or after performing, 
billing for, and being paid for work under the 
Excluded Sections, as a matter of law, Fox should 
have known that Porter expected additional 
compensation for its work under the Excluded 
Provisions. [FN5] 
*5 H 22 The facts set forth in Fox's opposition 
papers do not create a material dispute regarding 
whether (1) Fox requested Porter to perform the 
work under the Excluded Sections, (2) Porter 
expected additional compensation from Fox for the 
work, and (3) Fox knew or should have known that 
Porter expected additional compensation. Also, Fox 
does not dispute the amounts provided by Porter 
regarding the value of the work for which it was 
uncompensated. [FN6] Therefore, the trial court did 
not err when it granted Porter's motion for summary 
judgment against Fox for $161,309.08. [FN7] 
II. Porter's Appeal 
1f 23 Porter contends the trial court erred when it 
ruled the statute of limitations barred Porter's claims 
against National. To make a claim upon the Bond, 
Porter had to initiate its action "within one year 
after the last day on which [Porter] performed labor 
Oris. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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or service or supplied the equipment or material on 
which the claim is based." Utah Code Ann. § 
63-56-38(4) (2000). The trial court found, and 
National does not dispute on appeal, that the last 
day Porter worked on the Facility was May 16, 
1999. Thus, while Porter's claim against Fox, which 
was initiated on March 16, 2000, fell within the 
one-year limit, its claim upon the Bond that named 
National as a party, which was initiated on March 
14, 2001, fell outside the one-year limit and 
therefore would be barred. 
K 24 Porter contends that the one-year limit does 
not apply in this case. First, Porter argues that the 
discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations 
because Fox concealed Porter's claim against 
National. Second, Porter argues that under rule 
15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, its 
amended complaint adding National as a party and 
a claim upon the Bond relates back to its original 
complaint against Fox, which was filed within the 
one-year limit. 
A. Discovery Rule 
[10][11][12] K 25 In certain circumstances, the 
discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations period 
"until facts forming the basis for the cause of action 
are discovered." Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24,H 33, 
44 P.3d 742. However, under the discovery rule, it 
is a threshold issue whether the plaintiff knew or 
should have known about its cause of action before 
the statute of limitations ran. See Russell/Packard 
Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316,ffi[ 16-17, 
78 P.3d 616. We conclude that no legal justification 
exists for Porter's delay in naming National and 
making a claim upon the Bond. 
f 26 Utah Code section 63-56-39 provides that 
"[a]ny person may obtain from the state a certified 
copy of a bond upon payment of the cost of 
reproduction of the bond and postage, if any." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-39 (2000). To obtain a 
copy of the Bond, Porter either (1) could have gone 
to the University, requested a copy of the Bond, and 
paid copying fees, or (2) could have mailed a 
request to the University with return postage and 
payment for copying fees. See id. Instead, Porter 
attempted to obtain a copy of the Bond by 
requesting verbally a copy from Fox and sending a 
letter to the University without copying fees or 
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return postage, as required by statute. 
*6 U 27 Porter's conduct demonstrates that it knew 
of the Bond when it was considering litigation. 
Also, even if Porter had no specific knowledge of 
the Bond, as an experienced contractor, Porter 
should have known that a payment bond was 
required for construction of public structures, such 
as the Facility, under Utah Code section 63-56-38. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38 (2000). Yet Porter 
failed to invoke the procedure afforded it under the 
statute to learn the terms of the Bond. Thus, despite 
Fox's failure to disclose the terms of the Bond to 
Porter, there was no excuse for Porter's delay in 
bringing its claim upon the Bond. Because Porter 
knew or should have known about its claim at such 
a time that it still could have been brought within 
the one-year limit, the discovery rule cannot save 
Porter's claim from the statute of limitations. 
B. Relation Back Doctrine 
K 28 Porter also argues that the relation back 
doctrine under rule 15(c) permits the filing date of 
its original complaint to serve as the filing date for 
its amended complaint, which would place it within 
the one-year limit. National argues, and the trial 
court ruled, that the relation back doctrine does not 
apply to Porter's amended complaint because there 
is no identity of interest between National and Fox. 
1. Standard of Review 
[13][14] U 29 We must first determine the 
standard of review of a relation back determination 
under rule 15(c). While determining whether an 
amended pleading relates back seems like a purely 
legal determination, the standard of review Utah 
courts apply to such determinations has changed 
with the posture of the case on appeal. For instance, 
in Penrose v. Ross, 2003 UT App 157, 71 P.3d 631, 
because the relation back issue was decided on 
appeal from an order granting a motion for 
summary judgment, the court applied a 
"correctness" standard, holding that "[t]he trial 
court correctly determined there was no identity of 
interest ... to permit relation back of the Amended 
Complaint." Id. at ffi[ 7,21. However, in Nunez v. 
Albo, 2002 UT App 247, 53 P.3d 2, because the 
relation back issue was decided on appeal from an 
order denying a motion to amend, the court applied 
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an "abuse of discretion" standard and "analyze[d] 
each of the trial court's reasons for denying [the] 
motion to amend in light of rule 15's liberal 
standard," despite the fact that one of its reasons 
was that "joining the [defendant] would be futile 
[because the statute of limitations had run]." Id. at 
Vi 10,20. 
U 30 The difference, we think, stems from a 
failure to distinguish clearly rule 15(a) analysis 
from rule 15(c) analysis. In the context of a motion 
to amend, the trial court has discretion to follow 
rule 15(a)'s dictate that leave to amend pleadings 
"shall be freely given when justice so requires." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, where one of the 
reasons the nonmoving party provides for denying 
the motion to amend is that the statute of limitations 
bars the claim, the analysis is not the weighing of 
equitable factors under rule 15(a), but rather a legal 
determination regarding whether the amendment 
would be futile. See Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT 
App 76,K 7, 977 P.2d 497 (characterizing the 
appeal from denial of a motion to amend as 
"challenging the trial court's apparent conclusion 
that the statute of limitations had run and that their 
effort to amend their complaint was thus futile"); 
see also Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 514 
139, 82 P.3d 1076 (recognizing "that a court may 
deny a motion to amend as futile if the proposed 
amendment would not withstand a motion to 
dismiss" (quotations and citation omitted)). 
*7 D 31 Thus, a correctness standard applies to a 
trial court's rule 15(c) analysis and an abuse of 
discretion standard applies to a trial court's rule 
15(a) analysis. See Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 
911 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1996) (treating rule 15(a) 
analysis as logically prior to rule 15(c) analysis, but 
reviewing the relation back issue for correctness). 
This result is consistent with how a majority of 
courts, including the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, understand the doctrine. See Slade v. 
United States Postal Serv., 875 F.2d 814, 815 (10th 
Cir.1989) (stating that application of rule 15(c) is 
"purely legal determination" that is reviewed de 
novo); see also Miller v. American Heavy Lift 
Shipping, 231 F.3d 242, 247 (6th Cir.2000) ("[W]e 
review de novo the district court's decision to deny 
relation back of an amended complaint to the 
original complaint.'). 
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2. Utah's Relation Back Doctrine 
[15] [16] H 32 Utah's relation back doctrine 
developed out of the common law, under which a 
party could correct a clerical error without bringing 
a new action where the real parties were involved 
unofficially all along, Greenfield v. Wallace, 1 Utah 
188, 190 (1875), or make a "formal" change of 
party by amendment, such as substituting an 
administratrix for an heir where a cause of action 
already brought required the administratrix as a 
party. Pugmire v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 26 
Utah 115, 72 P. 385, 386 (1903). By the time these 
common law principles were incorporated into rule 
15(c), [FN8] the focus had expanded to whether (1) 
the amended pleading alleged only claims that 
"arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence 
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading," and (2) the added party had received 
notice that it would have been a proper party to the 
original pleading such that no prejudice would 
result from preventing the new party from using a 
statute of limitations defense that otherwise would 
have been available. [FN9] Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c); 
see also, Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 
906 (Utah 1976). 
[17] K 33 In Doxey-Layton, the first Utah case 
interpreting Utah's rule 15(c), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that an amendment substituting heirs for 
a husband and wife who had recently died, where 
the heirs had been informally involved in the 
litigation from the start, related back to the original 
pleading, and thus the statute of limitations did not 
bar the claim. See 548 P.2d at 905-06. The Court 
recognized that rule 15(c) generally does "not apply 
to an amendment which substitutes or adds new 
parties" because if it did, "the purpose of a statute 
of limitation would be defeated," but also 
recognized that "a mechanical use of a statute of 
limitations [should not] prevent adjudication of a 
claim" where "new and old parties have an identity 
of interest; so it can be assumed or proved the 
relation back is not prejudicial." [FN10] Id. at 906. 
"Such is particularly valid where ... the real parties 
in interest were sufficiently alerted to the 
proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially, 
from an early stage." Id. Where a new party had 
sufficient notice that it would have been a proper 
party to the original pleading, the purpose of the 
statute of limitations is not defeated by applying the 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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relation back doctrine to deprive the new party of 
its statute of limitations defense. 
*8 K 34 The court further elaborated the relation 
back doctrine in Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply 
Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984). In Peny, a general 
contractor brought a breach of contract claim 
against a subcontractor for defective doors the 
subcontractor had provided. See id. at 216. The 
subcontractor later filed an untimely third-party 
complaint against the supplier and manufacturer of 
the doors, in which its "only claim for relief stated 
that in the event [the subcontractor] was held liable 
to the general contractor [it] should have judgment 
against the supplier and the manufacturer in the 
same amount." Id. The court refused to apply the 
relation back doctrine because there was no 
"identity of interest between the original plaintiff, 
the defendant, and the third-party defendants other 
than privity of contract." Id. at 217. 
H 35 The court then outlined the test for "identity 
of interest" as follows: when "the parties are so 
closely related in their business operations that 
notice of the action against one serves to provide 
notice of the action to the other" (Notice Transfer 
Test). Id. After Perry, the notice required under the 
relation back doctrine could be actual notice, such 
as being informally involved in the litigation from 
the start, or constructive notice under the Notice 
Transfer Test. No matter how the formal test is 
articulated, what is crucial is that at an adequately 
early stage of the litigation, the new party was 
"sufficiently on notice of the facts and claims that 
gave rise to the proposed amendment." 3 James 
Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 15.19[1] 
(3d ed. 2001) ("The purpose of the statute of 
limitations is to prevent stale claims and the 
rationale of allowing an amendment to relate back is 
that once a party is notified of litigation involving a 
specific factual occurrence, the party has received 
the notice and protection that the statute of 
limitations requires."). 
f 36 In accordance with these principles, in two 
subsequent cases Utah courts refused to relate an 
amended pleading back where the added parties had 
no constructive notice (and clearly no actual notice) 
that they would have been proper parties under the 
original pleading. First, in Russell v. Standard 
Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995), the court held, in 
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a libel case, that there was not sufficient identity of 
interest between an Ogden newspaper on the one 
hand, and the Salt Lake Tribune and the Associated 
Press on the other hand, merely because they "adopt 
and incorporate the same material, pursuant to 
contractual agreements with one another." Id. at 265. 
Second, in Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878 
P.2d 1155 (Utah Ct.App.1994), this court held, in a 
personal injury case involving a faulty handrail in a 
new home, that there was not sufficient identity of 
interest between a general contractor, a realtor, and 
a realty company on the one hand and a lumber 
company and manufacturer on the other hand. See 
id. at 1158 n. 7. In neither case was it reasonable to 
assume that notice of the substance of the claims 
against the original parties served as notice to the 
added parties. 
*9 H 37 In two other cases, this court permitted 
relation back where the new party had sufficient 
actual notice that it would have been a proper party 
under the original pleading. In Hebertson v. Bank 
One, Utah, N.A., 1999 UT App 342, 995 P.2d 7, 
[FN 11] this court stated that relation back would be 
proper where the new parties (1) had actual notice 
of the original pleading, which clearly described an 
injury that had occurred at the time the new parties 
owned the property on which the injury had 
occurred, and (2) had the same insurer and attorney 
as the named party, the current owner of the 
property. See id. at K 19 n. 9. In Nunez v. Albo, 
2002 UT App 247, 53 P.3d 2, this court permitted 
relation back where the new party, a hospital, had 
actual notice of a malpractice claim against one of 
its doctors. See id. at K 30. 
K 38 Later cases apply the same common-law test, 
but articulate it in a slightly different way: "[P]arties 
have an identity of interest when 'the real parties in 
interest were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, 
or were involved in them unofficially, from an early 
stage.' " [FN 12] Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App 
76,H 14, 977 P.2d 497 (citation omitted); see 
Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247,1 29, 53 P.3d 2; 
Hebertson v. Bank One, Utah, N.A., 1999 UT App 
342,H 18, 995 P.2d 7. Thus, despite changes in 
how the relation back doctrine has been articulated, 
Utah courts have consistently applied the test 
developed under the common law: whether no 
prejudice would result because the added party had 
actual or constructive notice that it would have been 
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a proper party to the original pleading. 
U 39 For example, in Sulzen this court permitted 
relation back where parents were named in and 
served with a complaint in which their children 
were "clearly identified" as the negligent parties. 
1999 UT App 76 at H 15, 977 P.2d 497. Because 
the children lived with the parents, the court 
concluded that "it is entirely reasonable to assume 
that [the children] were sufficiently alerted to the 
proceedings." Id. 
11 40 Therefore, in spite of terminological shifts, 
the test for relation back under rule 15(c) remains as 
follows: whether (1) the amended pleading alleged 
only claims that arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to 
be set forth in the original pleading and (2) the 
added party had received (actual or constructive) 
notice that it would have been a proper party to the 
original pleading such that no prejudice would 
result from preventing the new party from using a 
statute of limitations defense that otherwise would 
have been available. 
2. Porter's Amended Pleading 
[18] K 41 National does not dispute that Porter's 
added claim upon the Bond naming National as a 
party "arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in 
[Porter's] original pleading." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c). 
National is liable only to the extent Porter succeeds 
on its claims against Fox, and no additional facts 
would be necessary to demonstrate National's 
liability other than its obligation under the Bond, 
which it does not dispute. 
*10 K 42 Thus, the only issue is whether National 
had sufficient actual or constructive notice that it 
would have been a proper party to the original 
pleading before the one-year limit expired. The 
focus of the trial court, and the parties below, was 
on whether the relationship between Fox and 
National was sufficient to satisfy the Notice 
Transfer Test (constructive notice) for identity of 
interest. The trial court ruled that the common 
interest between Fox and National was "privity of 
contract," which "as held in Perry, ... is an 
insufficient identity of interest to allow for relation 
back." We do not disagree, but the Notice Transfer 
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Test is a test for constructive notice, and is merely 
one way of demonstrating that an added party had 
sufficient notice to avoid prejudice. In addition, the 
relationship between National and Fox consists of 
more than privity of contract. 
[19] K 43 Porter argues that under the Notice 
Transfer Test the relationship between a general 
contractor and surety "as a matter of law ... is 
always sufficiently close to meet the 'identity of 
interest' standard with respect to bond claims." We 
do not adopt such a per se rule. There is no reason 
to infer, as a matter of law, that a general contractor 
would have alerted a surety to such a pleading. 
Thus, the Notice Transfer Test is not satisfied by 
the general contractor/surety relationship alone. 
[20] K 44 However, a consideration not addressed 
by the trial court, but that could be relevant to 
imputing notice to a new party, is whether it shared 
counsel with a named party prior to the running of 
the statute of limitations. See Hebertson v. Bank 
One, Utah, N.A., 1999 UT App 342,U 19 n. 9, 995 
P.2d 7 (considering having the same attorney and 
insurance carrier relevant to relation back analysis). 
While National and Fox currently have the same 
counsel, the record does not indicate whether they 
shared counsel prior to the lapse of the one-year 
limit or, if so, whether the nature of counsels' 
representation of National was such that imputation 
of notice is appropriate. See Singletary v. 
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 190 (3d 
Cir.2001) (refusing to impute notice where the new 
party did not retain the same counsel as the named 
party until after the statute of limitations had run). 
H 45 Furthermore, the parties and the trial court 
focused only upon the Notice Transfer Test. 
Application of the relation back doctrine also would 
be appropriate if National had sufficient actual 
notice of the original pleading prior to the running 
of the statute of limitations. Thus, we also remand 
for a determination of whether National had actual 
notice of the nature of Porter's claims against Fox, 
and therefore against the Bond, before the statute of 
limitations ran. [FN 13] See Sam Finley, Inc. v. 
Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 135 Ga.App. 14, 217 
S.E.2d 358, 362-63 (1975) (remanding for a 
determination of whether a surety had actual notice 
of the original complaint against the general 
contractor after deciding that the claim upon a 
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payment bond arose out of the same facts as the 
original claims). 
*11 K 46 Thus, we reverse and remand for a 
determination of all facts relevant to determining 
whether National had constructive or actual notice 
that it would have been a proper party to Porter's 
original complaint. 
C. Attorney Fees 
K 47 Finally, Porter claims that the trial court 
abused its discretion by awarding National attorney 
fees in the amount of $25,000 plus costs. [FN 14] 
Given our disposition of Porter's appeal, we vacate 
the award. 
CONCLUSION 
|^ 48 Because Fox did not set forth facts sufficient 
to create a disputed issue of material fact regarding 
Porter's implied-in-fact contract claim, the trial 
court did not err by concluding that Porter was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, 
we affirm. 
K 49 Because Porter's failure to bring its claim 
upon the Bond and against National within the 
one-year limit was due to Porter's own negligence, 
the discovery rule cannot save Porter's claim from 
the applicable statute of limitations. Porter's rule 
15(c) claim cannot be determined as a matter of law 
on the facts before the trial court. The record is 
insufficient for us to determine whether National 
had actual or constructive notice of Porter's original 
complaint. Therefore, we reverse and remand. We 
also vacate the award of attorney fees to National. 
H 50 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. 
GREENWOOD, Judge and GREGORY K. ORME, 
Judge. 
FN1. On November 1, 2003, rule 
4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration was repealed, and its 
procedural content was moved to rule 
7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
FN2. Although we are bound by the Utah 
Supreme Court's most recent interpretation 
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of rule 4-501(2)(B), we respectfully note 
that the rule announced by the court leaves 
it unclear what remedies are available to 
trial courts for a party's failure to follow 
the procedure outlined in rule 4-501(2)(B). 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure states that summary judgment is 
appropriate when "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and ... the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Id. If compliance with 
former-rule 4-501(2)(B), the procedural 
content of which is currently in rule 
7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is anything other than a mere 
suggestion, then it seems that a trial court 
must have the discretion to grant summary 
judgment in instances where it would not 
otherwise be sanctioned by rule 56(c) 
alone. In other words, if failure to comply 
with the rule is "harmless" as long as a 
disputed fact can be gleaned from the 
opposition papers, then the rule would 
seem to add nothing to what rule 56 
already requires. 
While fashioning the proper remedy for 
failure to comply with rule 7(c)(3)(B) 
remains within the trial court's discretion, 
see Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291,1f 
9, 77 P.3d 339, it currently is unclear 
whether granting summary judgment, 
because facts are admitted as undisputed 
that otherwise would not have been, is ever 
within the trial court's discretion for failure 
to comply with the rule. For this reason, 
and because the rule announced in Salt 
Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, 
Inc., 2004 UT 23, U 23 n. 4, 89 P.3d 155, 
was in a footnote with no reference to 
apparently conflicting prior case law, we 
ask the Utah Supreme Court to clarify the 
scope of remedies under rule 7(3)(c)(B) to 
guide trial courts. See Johnson v. 
Department of Transp., 2004 UT App 284, 
H 7 n. 2 (concluding that facts stricken 
pursuant to rule 4-501 would not have 
created a material dispute even if the facts 
should have been considered under the test 
in Metro West). 
FN3. Porter also makes independent 
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claims for breach of contract, breach of a 
contract implied at law, and breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
However, because Porter's implied-in-fact 
contract claim is sufficient to affirm the 
trial court's ruling, we do not discuss these 
additional claims. 
FN4. The fact reads as follows: "Mr. Cox 
explained that [Porter] and [Wood] had 
several conversations about the 
subcontract between Fox and Porter about 
2 issues; 1 is that there was a specification 
section left out of the subcontract and 2 is 
that a specification was included in the 
subcontract that should have been left out." 
Although any statements made by Porter 
would not be inadmissible hearsay because 
it would have been spoken by a party 
opponent, see Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2), no 
statement is specifically attributed to 
Porter in the fact submitted by Fox. 
FN5. Fox also asserts that it is proper to 
consider parol evidence when interpreting 
the scope of the subcontract not because it 
is ambiguous on its face, but rather 
because the trial court accepted that 
section 02680 was not part of the 
subcontract due to Porter and Fox's mutual 
agreement to strike the section when they 
discovered that it had been included by 
mistake. Fox seems to consider evidence 
of this subsequent mutual agreement parol 
evidence, and from this assumption 
concludes that all parol evidence should be 
considered to interpret the scope of the 
subcontract. However, because the 
subsequent mutual agreement between Fox 
and Porter to strike section 02680 was not 
a "contemporaneous [or prior] 
conversation [ ], representation ], or 
statement ]," Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, 
H 19, 44 P.3d 742 (first alteration in 
original) (quotations and citations 
omitted), it is not parol evidence. Also, it 
is not disputed in this case that section 
20680 is not part of the subcontract. Thus, 
Fox is mistaken that the trial court already 
had considered parol evidence when it 
agreed with the parties that section 02680 
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is outside the subcontract. 
FN6. Fox claims that the amount of 
damages cannot be determined on 
summary judgment because Porter 
identified the additional amount Fox owed 
it in 1999, before litigation had 
commenced, as "approximately 
$40,000.00" rather than the $161,309.08 it 
now claims. However, the mere fact that a 
plaintiff changes its damage calculation 
cannot preclude summary judgment, 
otherwise summary judgment would never 
be appropriate where damage calculations 
become more precise as discovery 
proceeds. Also, it is the nonmoving party's 
obligation to present the trial court 
admissible evidence to dispute the moving 
party's amounts. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
Fox simply has not done this. 
FN7. Fox also claims that the trial court 
erred by awarding attorney fees to Porter, 
but Fox's only argument is that the trial 
court should not have granted summary 
judgment in the first place. Because we 
disagree with Fox on this point and 
because Fox has advanced no additional 
argument upon which we could reverse the 
trial court's attorney fee award, we do not 
address the issue further. 
FN8. Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure states, "[W]henever the 
claim or defense asserted in the amended 
pleading arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading, the amendment relates back to 
the date of the original pleading." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 15(c). Even though Utah's rule 
15(c) does not explicitly mention the 
addition of parties as has the 
corresponding federal rule since 1966, see 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c), Utah's rule nonetheless 
embodies the same common law doctrines 
embodied in the federal rule regarding the 
addition of parties. See Doxev-Layton Co. 
v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906^ (Utah 1976) 
(citing commentary on the federal rule). 
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FN9. Misnomer cases, such as Greenfield 
v. Wallace, 1 Utah 188 (1875), are now 
analyzed under rule 15(c), and the analysis 
focuses upon whether there was sufficient 
notice to the real party of interest so that 
"relation back is not prejudicial." Wilcox v. 
Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 369 
(Utah 1996) (quotations and citation 
omitted) (permitting relation back where 
the plaintiff had served the correct 
defendant, Geneva Rock Products, Inc., 
but had named the defendant in the 
complaint as "Geneva Rock Corporation"); 
see Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App 76,1} 
30, 977 P.2d 497 (where a complaint 
misnamed a parent as guardian, rather than 
the child by and through the parent as 
guardian, relation back was permitted 
because service on the parent was legally 
sufficient for service on the child, the child 
clearly was identified in the body of the 
complaint, and no prejudice would result). 
FN 10. This point is consistent with 
interpretations of the corresponding federal 
rule. See 3 James Wm. Moore, Moore's 
Federal Practice § 15.19[3][c] (3d ed. 
2001) ("A court may find notice is 
adequate if there is a sufficient 'identity of 
interest' between the new defendant and 
the original one so that relation back will 
not be prejudicial."). 
FN11. While Hebertson v. Bank One, 
Utah, N.A., 1999 UT App 342, 995 P.2d 7, 
involved analysis of the savings statute, the 
court explicitly adopted the test under rule 
15(c) and applied it to the facts of the case 
to reach its savings-statute holding. See id. 
at H 18. 
FN 12. The shift in terminology appears to 
stem from the Russell court's 
misinterpretation of Perry as holding that 
identity of interest, a test for constructive 
notice, is a necessary, rather than a 
sufficient, condition for relation back. See 
Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 
265 (Utah 1995) ("[R]ule 15(c) does not 
apply to amendments that add new parties 
'who have no identity of interest with 
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existing parties.' " (quoting Perry, 681 
P.2d at 217)). The shift in terminology, 
however, has not affected the substance of 
the doctrine, but does explain the trial 
court's failure to focus upon whether 
National had actual notice of the substance 
of Porter's claims against Fox. 
FN 13. There are some indications that 
National did have actual notice. For 
example, Fox's president testified that the 
relationship between Fox and National was 
extremely close: "They pretty much knew 
when I cut my fingernails, yes." 
FN 14. While Porter challenges the 
reasonableness of the award, it does not 
challenge the trial court's statutory 
authority to award reasonable attorney fees 
and costs to the prevailing party, in this 
case National, to a "suit upon a payment 
bond." Utah Code Ann. § 63-56- 38(6) 
(2000). 
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